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Abstract
Assessing Inequality using Geographic Income Distributions
Boris Dev
Ordinarily, an analysis of income differentials based on standard metrics, such
as the variance statistic or the gini coefficient, implicitly weights income differen-
tials among different places the same, regardless of whether some pairs of places
are more economically interdependent than others. The problem with the assump-
tion that all pairs of places are uniformly interdependent is that changes in those
income differentials considered to be less relevant to the inequality concern being
addressed may quantitatively obscure acute changes of more relevant differentials.
This dissertation has three main chapters. The common aim of each chapter is
to incorporate geographic information into a metric’s formulation in order to make
it more relevant to an explicit concern. Each of the chapters of the dissertation
share three objectives: develop a spatial view of inequality based on a concern;
incorporate the spatial view into a metric’s formulation using a spatial weights
matrix; evaluate if the results based on spatial assessments diverge from aspatial
ones.
An important empirical finding of this research is that a proposed intra-city,
inter-race inequality metric registers acute differentials among latino and white
ix
neighborhoods that an additive decomposition metric does not register. A key
conceptual finding is the paradox that spatial inequality metrics formulated for
different concerns can register the same change in opposite directions.
x
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Interdependence
Geographic areas do not economically associate with one another in the same
way. Some associations are competitive. Schools in the United States, for exam-
ple, may battle with nearby schools for students and funding through influencing
the demarcation of school attendance zones (Kozol, 2005; U.S.551, 2007; U.S.717,
1974). Other associations are cooperative. For example, economic growth in a
city correlates to job growth in its contiguous rural economy, more so than to
growth in the national economy (Partridge and Rickman, 2007). Walter Isard
started the academic field of regional science, in the early 1950s, empirically and
conceptually investigating the association between this type of economic interde-
pendence among places and economic performance measurements (Isard, 1951).
More recent regional science research has investigated the association between in-
terdependence among places and income inequality measurements (Janikas, 2006;
Kanbur and Zhang, 1999; Duque, 2004; Rey and Folch, 2011; Rey, 2004a; Rey
1
and Dev, 2006a; Rey and Janikas, 2005; Janikas and Rey, 2005; Rey, 2004b, 2001;
Rey and Montouri, 1999).
Ordinarily, an analysis of income differentials based on standard metrics1, such
as the variance statistic or the gini coefficient, implicitly weights income differen-
tials among different places the same, regardless of whether some pairs of places
are more economically interdependent than others. The problem with the assump-
tion that all pairs of places are uniformly interdependent is that changes in those
income differentials considered to be less relevant to the inequality concern being
addressed may quantitatively obscure acute changes of more relevant differentials.
This dissertation proposes different methods for incorporating a spatial view of
cooperative and competitive associations among places within a income inequality
metric’s formulation, with the aim of making the resulting measurements more
relevant to different types of inequality concerns. A criteria for judging the rele-
vance of an inequality metric is that a trend upwards in its resulting measurements
reasonably reflects a worse situation regarding some explicit public concern.
1Standard income inequality metrics are reviewed in Cowell (1995); Foster and Sen (1997);
Temkin (1993). See Cowell (1995, p.153) for a list of metric formulations based on the summation
of income differentials.
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1.2 Spatial view
Our assessment of whether an income distribution change indicates a better or
worse situation is conditional on our spatial view. A spatial view, in the context of
this research, is a weighting scheme that gives some income differentials between
pairs of places more relevance than others for assessing an inequality situation.
Different spatial views are tied to different concerns. The geographic positioning
of places and the social position of the people in those places can inform a spatial
view.
To illustrate the relationship between a spatial view and an income inequality
assessment, consider how it is reasonable to view the change, shown in figure
1.1, of the income distribution from time periods 1 to 2 as a better situation.
The heights of the bars labeled i, j, k, l, denote the average size of the incomes
for people living in these hypothetical places. Our assessment of the situation
becomes more complicated when we geographically reference each place i, j, k, l,
as belonging either to the North or the South as in figure 1.2. Looking at figure
1.2, it is plausible to conclude that the distribution has changed for the worse,
since the people in the poorer area, k, of the North may have to suffer more from
competing for local resources against the people in the contiguous area j, who
experienced a rise in their incomes. Though opposite conclusions could be drawn
3
Figure 1.1: Hypothetical distribution change over time: aspatial view
from looking at 1.1 and 1.2, aspatial metrics, those not incorporating a spatial
view, would quantify both inequality situations in the diagrams as identical.
1.3 Spatial weights
A spatial view of whether geographic proximity represents greater competi-
tive or cooperative relationships can be represented by a spatial weights matrix.
Publicly available income data on administrative areal units, unlike less aggregate
household or individual level data, contains geographic references for defining a
spatial weights matrix. An element of a spatial weights matrix, wij, represents
how a pair of areas are connected, typically using 1 or 0, where 1 denotes greater
interdependence between the pair of areas than 0. For this research, the rule for
4
Figure 1.2: Hypothetical distribution change over time: spatial view
defining elements of the spatial weights matrix, W, within the formulation of an
inequality metric can be thought of as a way to formalize a notion of how some
income differentials are more important than others. Once again, a criteria for
judging the relevance of an inequality metric is that a trend upwards in its re-
sulting measurements reasonably reflects a worse situation. If I() is an income
inequality metric that summarizes a vector x of income values for a set of admin-
istrative areas into a single number, then I(x2) > I(x1) implies that the income
distribution changed for the worse, where 1 and 2 denote the starting and ending
time.2 An aim of this dissertation is to examine how representing spatial view in
2Naturally, if comparisons are to be valid across time, then there must have existed reasonably
consistent rules for defining the administrative areas of the geographic system being studied. For
instance, the rule of the United States census tracts are “Designed to be relatively homogeneous
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a metric’s formulation can make its resulting measurements more relevant to an
explicit aspect of inequality. In other words, I(x2,W2) > I(x1,W1) is intended
to be more relevant to some explicit aspect of inequality that we are concerned
with than I(x2) > I(x1).
The relevance problem of this research is different from the problem of making
valid comparisons between different geographic systems, I(x) > I(y), where x
and y are vectors of incomes from different geographic systems. The Modifiable
Areal Unit Problem (MAUP) addresses the comparability problem. According to
the MAUP, it is problematic to use measurements based on data referenced to
a cross-section of areas to make valid comparisons amongst different geographic
systems, such as countries, since differences in income inequality measurements
between two geographic systems can be arbitrary due to variations in the scale of
the chosen administrative unit (i.e., tract, county, state) (Oppenshaw and Taylor,
1991) and regionalization (or zonation) scheme (Duque, 2004; Rey and Folch,
2011).
To understand the meaning of a spatial weights matrix more technically,
consider i to be an index for a set of communities (say city neighborhoods),
i = {1, · · · , n}; And, consider X to be a spatial random process and Xi some
economic outcome of the process for area i, which can denote income, or some-
units with respect to population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions, census
tracts average about 4,000 inhabitants.”(Census Bureau, 2013).
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thing that income proxies such as the capability of a place to access local goods
like education or health. The spatial weights matrix, W = [wij], can be thought
of as follows:
wij

1, if P (xi) 6= P (xi|xj) , with i, j ∈ I and i 6= j
0, otherwise;
If the element wij of the matrix is 1 then the probability of outcome in one
place i is dependent on the outcome in an another interconnected place j.
1.4 Overview of chapters
This dissertation has three main chapters. The common aim of each chapter is
to incorporate geographic information into a metric’s formulation in order to make
it more relevant to an explicit concern. Each of the chapters of the dissertation
share three objectives:
• Develop a spatial view of inequality based on a concern.
• Incorporate the spatial view into a metric’s formulation using a spatial
weights matrix.
• Evaluate if the results based on spatial assessments diverge from aspatial
ones.
7
Chapter 2 proposes a metric to identify subsets of high income differentials
tied to a concern over acute inter-community competition over local resources.
To represent competitive associations, chapter 2 incorporates spatial structure by
giving greater weight to income differentials between pairs of census tracts of dif-
ferent racial classification that are co-located within the same metropolitan zone.
Borrowing from the field of exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) (Anselin and
Getis, 2010; Janikas and Rey, 2005), chapter 2 uses spatial permutations (Rey,
2004a) for assessing the empirical significance of incorporating geographic and
racial references to define the spatial weights matrix of a metric.
Chapter 3 proposes a convergence metric tied to a concern for institutional
unfairness in the distribution of income across states of the United States. Chapter
3 incorporates spatial weights into the metric by giving less weight to income
differential changes attributed to economic spillovers from contiguous states of
the United States. Extending Rey and Dev (2006b), chapter 3 implements spatial
filtering as a method for down weighting income dispersion changes associated to
spatially autocorrelated residuals from a income convergence regression. Spatial
autocorrelation describes the geographic clustering of like values.3 Rey and Folch
(2011) show that making comparisons using segregation metrics may not be valid
3For Getis (2008), the best definition to spatial autocorrelation is “Given a set S containing
n geographical units, spatial autocorrelation refers to the relationship between some variable
observed in each of the n localities and a measure of geographical proximity defined for all
n(n− 1) pairs chosen from n (Hubert et al., 1981, p.224).”
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since their results are impacted not just by the dispersion parameter in the data
generating process of the income values, but also by each city’s different geographic
dimensions, such as zonation, geographic extent, scale, and, most relevant to
this discussion, spatial autocorrelation. Chapter 3 of this dissertation proposes a
metric that filters out the impact of spatial autocorrelation on income dispersion
change.
Chapter 4 proposes a metric tied to a concern for identifying specific segments
of a school attendance zone boundary that might act as barriers to a child’s coop-
erative encounters with children of other income classes. Chapter 4 incorporates
spatial structure into the metric by giving greater weight to income differentials
among blocks that are contiguous, to proxy potential encounters, and that are
located on different sides of an attendance boundary, representing a social bar-
rier attributable to school competition over higher income students. Borrowing
from Rey (2004a), Chapter 4 uses spatial permutations for identifying local “hot
spots”, where a boundary’s segment appears to split areas by income size. It is
important to note, the aim of chapter 4’s metric, like chapter 2’s metric, is not to
inform a concern for the culprit of the boundary design, but rather to highlight
areas, in the spirit of exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) (Anselin and Getis,
2010; Janikas and Rey, 2005), in terms of a concern for the effects of institutional
boundaries.
9
1.5 Related literature
Like this research, sociologists Morrill (1991); Jargowsky and Kim (2005);
Wong (1993); Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004) represent geographic proximity as
spatial weights with the aim of making their residential segregation metrics more
relevant. Morrill (1991); Wong (1993); Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004)’s specific
aim is to attack the checkerboard problem of the most common metric of seg-
regation, the dissimilarity index (Duncan and Duncan, 1955). The dissimilarity
index is the percentage of the poor population that would hypothetically need to
relocate to a new area in order to make each area have the same composition of
poor people. White (1983), who first coined the term, the checkerboard problem,
describes it as follows: “Allow the squares on a checkerboard to represent parcels
(neighborhoods, tracts, blocks). Once the composition of each parcel (square) is
given, any spatial rearrangement of them will still result in the same calculation
for the dissimilarity index. A city in which all the nonwhite parcels were concen-
trated into one single ghetto would have the same level of calculated segregation
as a city with dispersed pockets of minority residents.” Sociologist’s spatial seg-
regations metrics (Morrill, 1991; Jargowsky and Kim, 2005; Wong, 1993; Reardon
and O’Sullivan, 2004) give less weight to income and racial composition differ-
entials among areas in geographic proximity. The premise is that differentials
10
Table 1.1: Framework of spatial inequality metrics
Types of concerns:
Correlates of proximity: effect cause
cooperation spatial segregation literature chapter 3
competition chapter 2, chapter 4 Chakravorty (1996)
among neighboring areas are not as bad as differentials among non-neighboring
areas since they indicate potential encounters between black and white, or rich
and poor. This downward adjustment is tied to a concern for the effects of resi-
dential segregation on limiting the interaction among racial groups (Morrill, 1991;
Wong, 1993; Reardon and O’Sullivan, 2004) and income groups of the same race
(Jargowsky and Kim, 2005).
Table 1.1 organizes the difference between the research on spatial segregation
metrics, discussed above, and this dissertation research along two dimensions. The
first dimension, along the table columns, divides metrics by whether they are are
tied to a concern of a cause or an effect (outcome) of income and racial imbalances
across administrative areas. The second dimension, along the table rows, divides
metrics based on whether geographic proximity represents greater competitive or
cooperative relationships.
Chapter 3’s metric, like spatial segregation metrics, equates proximity to coop-
eration. Chapter 3, unlike spatial segregation metrics, is tied to a causal concern,
the political concern that unfair institutional arrangements might cause higher in-
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come differentials among states. In contrast, spatial segregation metrics are tied
to a concern for the effects of segregation: the concern that residential imbalances
of race (Morrill, 1991; Wong, 1993; Reardon and O’Sullivan, 2004) and income
(Jargowsky and Kim, 2005) are instrumental in reducing social encounters, which
can lead to the social isolation of poorer minority groups.
Chapters 2’s and 4’s metric, like spatial segregation metrics, are tied to con-
cerns over the effects of income and race imbalances. Chapters 2 and 4, unlike
spatial segregation metrics, equate proximity to competition. In chapter 2, prox-
imity represents competitive associations among ethnic neighborhoods of the same
metropolitan zone, and in in chapter 4 proximity represents competitive associa-
tions between two schools with contiguous attendance zones
Similar to the sociologist’s spatial segregation studies, from Partridge and
Rickman (2007)’s perspective proximity between poor rural areas and rich urban
areas equates to cooperative associations. Using county cross-sectional observa-
tions, they provide evidence that a rural area’s proximity to the industries of a
rich metropolitan area is associated to more jobs in the poor rural area.
To this author’s knowledge few, if any studies, exist to fill the bottom right
quadrant of table 1.1 (proximity as competition, concern as unfairness), with the
possible exception of Chakravorty (1996). (Chakravorty, 1996, p.1672) proposes a
measure of “spatial (or neighbourhood) disparity based on the difference in value
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between a parcel and the (weighted) average of its neighbours.” (Chakravorty,
1996, p.1684) says “It may also be useful to find out how well the new measures
provide information on social inequality. . . ” (Chakravorty, 1996, p.1684) hints
that his metric could inform concerns of policy unfairness:“The relationship be-
tween inequality in space and abstract inequality is particularly intriguing, as it
touches upon critical and unexamined policy issues. . . ”.
1.6 Specific versus general concerns
It is important to distinguish between this research’s explicit, narrowly de-
fined concerns regarding income differentials among places versus broader notions
of inequality. Cowell (1995); Temkin (1993); Foster and Sen (1997) associate the
relevance of inequality metrics to broader notions, such as “how people fare rela-
tive to one another”, social welfare, social justice, and egalitarianism. Using the
measurements of a spatial metric to make general statements on these broader
notions of inequality is problematic. Incorporating a spatial view into the for-
mulation of income inequality metrics may increase their relevance to addressing
some specific concerns while potentially decreasing their relevance to other specific
concerns and broader notions of inequality. If we do not tie an explicit concern
to an explicit spatial view of a metric’s formulation then the relevance of our
inequality assessments will be ambiguous.
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To illustrate how different spatial structures are associated to different con-
cerns, consider the following: In what sense would bigger income differentials
among places be viewed by an impartial spectator 4 as a good or bad situation?
Below are three different inequality concerns that are associated with three differ-
ent spatial structures. First, if the spectator’s concern is political, such as Rawl’s
notion that unfair institutional arrangements can cause worse income dispersion,
then the most relevant income differentials changes to be registered by a metric
should be those associated with independent places connected by a shared politi-
cal system, reflecting the concern in chapter 3. Second, if the spectator’s concern
is about the effect or outcome of income differentials on the capability of poor
places to compete with other places for local resources, such as food, schooling,
land or medical care, then the most important income differentials to account for
would be between pairs of places in close enough proximity to one another to com-
pete for local resources, reflecting the concern in chapters 2 and 4. Third, if the
spectator’s concern is about the effect of residential income segregation limiting
social encounters between rich people and poor people, reflecting the concern of
the sociologists (Morrill, 1991; Wong, 1993; Reardon and O’Sullivan, 2004; Jar-
gowsky and Kim, 2005), then the most important differentials would be among
4This use of an “impartial spectator” for a mental experiment is extended from Smith (1776)
and Foster and Sen (1997).
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contiguous places where there is a lesser chance for rich and poor cooperative
social encounters.
The three above income inequality concerns are tied to three different spatial
views. A hypothetical change in the spatial pattern of incomes, where the richest
people moved closer to the poorest, will have a different meaning in terms of these
different concerns. On one hand, this would be irrelevant for the first concern
for assessing unfairness, since it is a endogenous, voluntary change. On the other
hand, this change would be registered as a decrease (a better situation) in the
sociologist’s spatial segregation measurements, which are tied to the third con-
cern above relating to social encounters among different groups. In contrast, this
change could be registered in the opposite direction, as an increase (a worse sit-
uation), by measurements aimed to assess local resource competition, the second
concern above, and motivating chapters 2 and 4,
In summary, spatial inequality measurements tied to broad notions, instead of
specific concerns, of inequality can lead to ambiguous interpretations. Different
specific concerns require different definitions of what is the most relevant spatial
structure connecting places. Most importantly, do we equate geographic proximity
with competition or cooperation? The answer to the question is conditional on
the type of specific concern we prioritize.
15
1.7 Unfairness as a cause versus suffering as an effect
Specific concerns for assessing income differentials among administrative areas
can be split in two by direction of causality. One set of concerns relates to an
aversion to unfairness in governmental institutions associated with causing higher
income differentials among places. The second set of concerns relates to an aver-
sion to suffering as an effect (or outcome) of higher income differentials.
Rawls and Kelly (2001, p.59) explain the concern for unfairness: to “...as-
sess the basic structure according to how it regulates citizens’ shares of primary
goods... ”. Decreasing income differentials among places can indicate progress,
or a just economic system, as Rawls (1999, p.78) states “Eventually the result-
ing material benefits spread throughout the system to the least advantaged.” In
terms of unfairness as a cause, examples of empirical studies that explicitly tie
interregional income inequality measurements to unfairness in government policies
are as follows. At the regional level, rising regional income inequality measure-
ments have been associated to trade liberalization policies by Sa´nchez-Reaza and
Rodr´ıguez-Pose (2002) and Rivas (2007). Fan and Casetti (1994) interpret rising
state income dispersion as evidence against the Neoclassical economic theory’s
prediction(Solow, 1956; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004a) that the current political
economy based on market principles leads to regional income convergence. At the
16
inter-neighborhood level, persistent trends in Black-White residential segregation
measurements are associated to a lack of institutional progress in dealing with
historically unfair housing discrimination (Massey and Denton, 1993) , as well as
attitudes on race Massey and Denton (1987, p.823). Lieberson and Carter (1982)
attribute 85 percent of black segregation in 1970 to involuntary causes. From a
qualitative perspective, Kozol (2005) blames politically influenced demarcation of
attendance to large income differentials between rich and poor school attendance
zones in New York City.
Rey and Dev (1997) and Rey and Folch (2011) point out how a problem of
using changes in inequality measurements to make causal inferences is that income
values among areas may not be independent of one another. For instance, spa-
tial segregation metrics of Morrill (1991); Wong (1993); Reardon and O’Sullivan
(2004); Jargowsky and Kim (2005) are not suited to make inferences on institu-
tional unfairness as a culprit to increased measurements, since these metrics are
formulated to be sensitive to changes in the level of spatial autocorrelation. In
other words, as Rey and Folch (2011, p.431) point out, “the formulation of these
spatial measures assumes that regions with greater clustering of similar neighbor-
hoods are more ’segregated’.”
Trend changes in spatial income autocorrelation could reflect changes in the
impact of endogenous forces on spatial income distribution change. Changes in
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the trend of spatial income autocorrelation across time have been recorded by
Rey and Montouri (1999) and Rey and Dev (1997). Rey and Folch (2011) point
out that changes in spatial autocorrelation of neighborhood incomes can reflect
changes in interacting choices of residents leading to residential clustering of racial
and income groups (de facto segregation), an issue separate from institutional un-
fairness (de jure segregation). The consequences of interacting residential choices
leading to a racially segregated city is described by the Schelling segregation model
(Schelling, 1971; Zhang, 2004; Clark, 1991).The consequences of residential pref-
erences leading to a income class segregated city is described by the Tiebout class
of models (Tiebout, 1956; Epple, 2003; Epple and Romano, 2003; Epple and Platt,
1998). When we observe changes in the trend of spatial income autocorrelation
across time this could reflect changes in the impact of Tiebout and Schelling type
endogenous forces on how people geographically sort themselves across areas. The
equifinality problem here is about the the ambiguity of accounting for what por-
tion of a changing trend in a spatial inequality measurement stems from changes
in institutional unfairness (exogenous) or from changes in voluntary choices (en-
dogenous).
It is important to note that this equifinality problem is not an issue for metrics
aimed at concerns on the effects or outcomes of high income differentials, which
are proposed in chapters 2 and 4.
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Providing a conceptual framework to empirical studies on the effects of in-
come differentials on suffering, we can extend Sen and Foster (2006)’s notion
of ‘Smithian interdependencies’ from individuals to social groups. Sen and Fos-
ter (2006, p.213) explain ‘Smithian interdependencies’ paraphrasing Adam Smith
(Smith, 1776, pp.351-2): “appearing in public without shame” may require more
expensive clothes in a richer country than a poorer one, given by the established
standards. The same applies to the capability of “taking part in the life of the
community.” Sen (1997) argues that relative income deprivation is not just un-
fortunate because some are poorer than others, but rather its importance lies in
its potential to be instrumental in the deprivation of people’s absolute economic
capabilities.
In terms of suffering as an effect, examples of empirical studies that explicitly
tie bigger income differentials among places to specific negative outcomes are as
follows. In terms of regional income differentials within a country, Kanbur and
Zhang (1999) and Xue (1997, p.46) warn that “differences may create serious so-
cial and political problems, generate nationalist conflicts and negatively influence
China’s economic and social stability.” Income differentials among neighborhoods
of the same city are associated to the deterioration of public infrastructure in the
inner city (Massey and Denton, 1993), middle class migration (Wilson, 1987a),
and role model migration (Durlauf, 2004). Kozol (2005) associates income differ-
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entials between rich and poor school zones of the same city to feelings of social
isolation.
Multi-level modeling studies use aspatial income inequality metrics as explana-
tory variables in regressions to correlate economic inequality of an individual’s
surroundings to lower health outcomes (Krieger et al., 1997; Diez-Roux et al.,
2000; Kennedy et al., 1998; Subramanian et al., 2001, 2004), as well as voting out-
comes (Galbraith and Hale, 2008). Evidence exists, however, that a spatial metric,
giving more weight to income differentials between different social groups located
in the same city, may be an alternative to standard aspatial inequality metrics
for explaining outcomes such as crime (Blau and Blau, 1982), the economic out-
comes of children (Borjas, 1995), urban medical care (Deaton, 2003) and urban
famine (Sen, 1977). Amartya Sen frames the concept of income inequality as an
instrumental cause of economic inequality, the broader concept (Sen, 1997). As
a possible future direction of research, the spatial income inequality metrics pro-
posed in chapter 2, based on income differentials among urban areas of different
ethnicity, and chapter 4, based on differentials among areas on different sides of
a school attendance boundary, could be considered as an alternative to aspatial
income inequality metrics in multi-level modeling studies, if they are considered
closer proxies to capturing to the capability deprivation aspect of surrounding
economic inequality within the multi-level model.
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Studies, such as Levernier et al. (1998); Partridge et al. (1996); Levernier
et al. (2000, 1995); Partridge et al. (1998), also analyze administrative income
data (state and county), but they have a different spatial focus and motivating
concern than this research. They assess intra-area family income differentials,
as opposed to this research’s focus on inter-area differentials. They investigate
potential factors influencing family income inequality, such as increasing returns
to education, industrial restructuring, international trade, immigration, subur-
banization, urbanization, industrial composition, and female labor-force partici-
pation. Their motivation is to understand how place-specific attributes may play
a causal role in rising income inequality, and not related to this research’s con-
cerns for assessing unfairness or identifying subsets of the most relevant income
differentials associated to bad outcomes. An interesting empirical finding of these
studies (Levernier et al., 1998; Partridge et al., 1996; Levernier et al., 2000, 1995;
Partridge et al., 1998) is that increasing convergence at the interregional level
co-exists with divergence at the intraregional level.
1.8 Summary
We cannot directly observe how people are connected with one another. How-
ever, we can approximate the spatial structure of how people are economically
connected by cooperative and competitive associations using information on their
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geographic and social positions. In order to assess inter-area income inequal-
ity with public data on administrative areal units, census tracts (in chapter 2),
states (in chapter 3), and school attendance zones (in chapter 4), this dissertation
proposes new metrics that incorporate spatial weight matrices representing the
impact of cooperative and competitive associations on either the causes or effects
of spatial income distribution change. A quantitative determination of whether
income inequality has gotten better or worse can be thought of as being a function
of two pieces of information: one, an explicit concern of why an income differen-
tial between two places is bad, and, two, an explicit spatial view of how change
in some income differentials among different areas is more relevantly associated
to an explicit concern than other differentials. The premise of this research is
that the relevance of a change in the income differential between two places is
not only related to its size, but also to how the people of the different places are
interdependent.
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Chapter 2
Assessing income inequality across
neighborhoods
2.1 Introduction
Amartya Sen frames the concept of income inequality as an instrumental cause
of economic inequality, the broader concept (Sen, 1997). He argues that relative
income deprivation is not just unfortunate because some are poorer than others,
but rather its importance lies in its potential to be instrumental in the deprivation
of people’s absolute economic capabilities. Sen and Foster (2006, p.213) uses the
term ‘Smithian interdependencies’ for a notion he explains by paraphrasing Adam
Smith (Smith, 1776, pp.351-2), of “appearing in public without shame” may re-
quire more expensive clothes in a richer country than a poorer one, given by the
established standards. The same applies to the capability of “taking part in the
life of the community.” Extending the notion of Smithian interdependencies from
an inter-personal to an inter-group level, a problem of standard inequality mea-
surements is that they may obscure acute changes in subsets income differentials
associated to the negative outcomes of competition among ethnic neighborhoods
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over local economic resources such as school funding (Kozol, 1991), role models
(Durlauf, 2004), or quality medical care (Deaton, 2003).
The aim of the proposed metric of this chapter is to identify a pattern of widen-
ing income differentials between people of different social positions who live within
the same geographic zone, or what I term inter-social, inter-zonal inequality. In
contrast to additive decomposition approaches, which are useful in evaluating the
extent of income inequality in a proportional sense for different parts society (Sen
and Foster, 2006), the proposed spatial metrics of this chapter capture the in-
tensity or acuteness of subsets of income differentials. Extending Rey (2004a)’s
spatial randomization method, this chapter’s approach can identify a significant
difference in the average size of a particular subset of income differentials com-
pared to socially or geographically more aggregate sets of differentials. I provide
an empirical illustration using the income differentials between over 44,000 census
tracts of the United States, referenced by 4 social groups (Black, White, Latino,
and Mixed) and 238 metropolitan zones, for the 1980, 1990, and 2000. Intra-
zonal differentials are defined using pairs of tracts that are co-located in the same
metropolitan area of a total of 238 metropolitan zones.
For assessing the relevance of the spatial (or interdependent) perspective for
describing changing income inequality, I propose two necessary conditions. (1)
There needs to be a substantive distinction between the effect on economic in-
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equality of an income gap change between two particular social groups in the
same zone and other aspatial (or aggregate) changes, ones that ignore the social
and geographic references this chapter’s approach jointly uses to organize the ob-
servations. (2) There needs to be empirical evidence that a change in the average
size of this subset of inter-social, intra-zonal differentials is significantly different
than changes associated with socially or geographically more aggregate sets of in-
come differentials. Next, I introduce the substantive issue, and then the empirical
one.
(1) I argue that a widening of the income gap between two associations of
people does not inherently lead to more economic suffering; The affect is con-
ditional on how the gap alters the ability of at least one of the associations to
obtain economic resources. The premise here is that the ability of a social group
or community to convert income into certain economic capabilities is coupled to
their income relative to other groups (or communities) in their same geographic
zone. For example, once again, inter-social, intra-zonal income inequalities can
cause deprivation from competition between communities over locally bounded
economic resources such as school funding (Kozol, 1991), role models (Durlauf,
2004), or quality medical care (Deaton, 2003).
(2) Differentiating between a subset of inter-social, intra-zonal differentials and
a socially or geographically more aggregate set of differentials is empirically im-
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portant only if the disaggregate subset of differentials changes in a significantly
different way than the aggregate one. Extending Rey (2004a), I present a per-
mutation test for identifying a statistically significant difference in size between a
intra-zonal, inter-social measure and its socially or geographically more aggregate
counterpart. The permutation test shuﬄes the geographic and social labels of
neighborhoods to build empirical distributions of the measures.
As a preview, this chapter’s results provide evidence of how using a separate
intra-zonal measure and a separate inter-social measure may not necessarily cap-
ture what a jointly defined inter-social, intra-zonal measure can: Between 1980 and
1990 the observed inequality reducing change associated with differentials between
White and Mixed neighborhoods located in the same metropolitan zones was op-
posite the inequality enhancing change of both the socially aggregate intra-zonal
measure and the geographically aggregate White-Mixed measure. In addition,
this chapter’s results show that the large size of the average income differentials
associated with Latino and White pairs of neighborhoods located in the same
metropolitan zones would be masked by relying on a proportional perspective of
an additive decomposition of variance, as well as underestimated by socially and
geographically more aggregate equivalent measures.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2.2, I discuss the spatial (or in-
terdependent) perspective of measuring changes in income inequality. In section
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2.3, I propose a framework to account for spatial structure in inequality measures.
In section 2.4, I discuss an empirical illustration, and, in section 2.5, I end with
concluding remarks.
2.2 Spatial Weights
Standard income inequality measures based on geographic data make an im-
plicit aggregate assumption that the income gap between two subareas in faraway
places is as important as the gap between nearby subareas. To illustrate this,
I examine how the variance statistic, V , measures changes in income inequality.
Consider distributions of income over n subareas (neighborhoods), i = 1, ..., n,
and let yi,t be the logarithm of per capita income of subarea i at time t. Let the
average level of income for all subareas be y¯t =
1
n
∑n
i=1 yi,t, so that V is given by:
Vt = 1/n
n∑
i=1
(yi,t − y¯t)2 (2.1)
Evidence of reduced economic inequality is reflected in equation (2.1) declining
over time, such as:
V2 < V1 (2.2)
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2 denotes an ending time period, and 1 denotes a starting time. A problem with
this description of inequality is that it is possible that an observed flat trend in
aggregate income dispersion Vt may hide discordant shifts in important income
differentials, or distributional churning.1 Therefore, the most important income
differentials are the ones associated with interdependent parts of society that are
particularly sensitive to the link between changes in their relative incomes and
economic suffering. For example, substantively, income gap changes between con-
tiguous communities that compete for public school funding in the United States
would be more important than changes between family and student neighbor-
hoods.
For this chapter, the problematic implicit assumption of aggregate descriptions
is how they weigh all income differentials the same irrespective of the importance
of the geographic or social positions of people. I use the term ‘income gap’ to
refer to the squared difference in the logarithm of income between two subareas,
1This issue is no longer relevant if differentials between social positions or subareas move
in concordance with one another, such as the consequence of a catch-up convergence process
(Bernard and Durlauf, 1996). At the regional scale, examples against such a broad based
characterization of income gap movements are Quah (1996b)’s results of an evolving bi-polar
distribution of European regions and Rey (2002)’s results of spatially conditioned inter-mixing of
relative ranks for US states. Though all deal with spatial aspects of income distribution changes,
this chapter is different from Quah (1996b) and Rey (2002), because of two reasons. First, this
chapter’s approach is to use social information jointly with geographic information to represent
spatial structure. Second, this chapter’s method deal with providing information on economic
inequality at small area or neighborhood scale in terms of potential suffering as an effect of
income inequality, instead of regional economic convergence as a cause of lower inequality.
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such as:
dij = (yi − yj)2 (2.3)
where i, j are pairs of subareas. I believe it is important to differentiate amongst
income differentials based on the distance between i, j in terms of affecting the
probability that the associated communities compete with one another for eco-
nomic resources.
Consider how a pair-wise computation of variance, based on income differ-
entials, leads to an equivalent result as equation (2.1). Income variance can be
understood as twice the average of all income differentials dij, as follows:
2V =
∑∑
dij
n(n− 1) (2.4)
The denominator of the above equation, n(n−1), is the total count of all possible
differentials between subareas i, j. The numerator of the RHS of equation (2.4)
is the sum of the squared deviations of income differentials, from equation (2.3).
2V is equivalent to the average of the universe of such differentials.
To see how spatial structure is implied by the variance statistic consider it as
weighted average of all income differentials.
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2V =
∑∑
wijdij
n(n− 1) (2.5)
By defining all wij’s as 1 makes explicit the assumption that the spatial struc-
ture of the income differentials is irrelevant to capturing the effects of income
differentials on economic welfare.2
When the intent of using the variance statistic as a global measure of disper-
sion is not socially relevant, in other words not pertaining to any direct interest for
monitoring economic capability deprivation, it is reasonable to weight all pair-wise
deviations dij the same, ignoring variation in wij (i.e. w11 = w12 = ...wnn = 1) .
An example of an intention not related to assessing social welfare is the academic
adjudication of neoclassical theory’s hypothesis of income convergence across re-
gions of a country (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003), or of Marxist Geography’s
prediction of divergence (Massey, 1979). However, if an income inequality study
is made with the intent to assess economic capability deprivation in the sense
2More technically, consider i, I to be an index and set of communities (say city neighbor-
hoods), i = {1, · · · , n}; And, consider X to be a spatial random process and Xi the ability of a
community i to convert income to local economic resources. This interdependence is conditional
on an unobserved, spatial structure by which the ability of a community to obtain economic re-
sources is linked to its income relative to other ones of society. The spatial structure, W = [wij ],
can be thought of as follows:
wij
{
1, if P (xi) 6= P (xi|xj) , with i, j ∈ I and i 6= j
0, otherwise;
30
of (Sen, 1997), I argue, that it is questionable to weight all pairs the same, es-
pecially in light of the problems of potential unfairness or deprivation that are
coupled with large income differentials between different social groups competing
for economic resources in the same geographic zone.
The advantage of the pair-wise approach to computing variance in equation
(2.4) is the simplicity by which we can use weights to represent spatial structure
in a formulation of a inequality measure. Squared income differentials between
all n subareas in the population can be represented by a matrix D = [dij] (from
equation (2.3)). D can be decomposed into two components, spatial and aspatial:
2n(n-1)V = 1
′
(W D)1︸ ︷︷ ︸ + 1′(W+ D)1︸ ︷︷ ︸
spatial aspatial
(2.6)
W = [wij] represents pairs of subareas i, j using binary weights and its matrix
complement (switching the ones for zeros) is W+. 1 is a n by 1 vector of ones
and 1
′
its transpose.
The general formulation of this chapter’s spatial income inequality measures I
define as a function V (·) based on the respective spatial weights matrix, as follows:
V (W) =
1
′
(W D)1
nw
(2.7)
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nw is the count of the non-zero, non-diagonal elements of W. The result of
equation (2.7) is simply the average size of each income gap represented by non-
zero elements of W. The result is also the equivalent to the spatial component
of equation (2.6). Given that the average size of all differentials for a set of
subareas, I, is the same as that for some subset of differentials represented by non-
zero elements of W then the values of the aggregate measure V and the spatial
measure V (W) would correspond as 1 = V (W)/2V , as a result of combining
equation (2.5) and equation (2.7).
We use observations of a change such as V2(W) > V1(W) to get a more
spatially detailed picture of how income inequality is changing than can be viewed
with V2 > V1, as illustrated below in section 4.
All inequality measures, implicitly or explicitly can be thought of as repre-
senting spatial structure. If explicitly represented, this spatial structure can be
thought of as reflecting notions of the priority of describing some differentials over
others. Any particular spatial perspective taken to discern changes in inequality
in one part of society could obscure the existence of changes in a related part of
society.3
3For instance, consider a hypothetical change in a situation where the order of the income
levels for three groups of world citizens are as follows: 1st-Americans, 2nd-Chinese, 3rd-Tibetans.
If only the Chinese income levels move, narrowing their gap with Americans, then the gap
between Chinese and Tibetans would simultaneously widen. If Chinese and Tibetans compete
with one another for economic resources in the same geographic zone, but not with Americans,
then the movement of Chinese incomes could be said to be economic inequality enhancing, even
though, hypothetically, the aggregate income dispersion may have remained the same or gone
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Standard additive decomposition approaches can also give a disaggregate pic-
ture of changing intra-zonal inequality. Consider a set of subareas that can be
partitioned into geographic zones. A two part additive decomposition of total
dispersion T of incomes of all subareas would appear as follows:
T = B + IN (2.8)
B summarizes the cumulative size of differentials between geographic zones, as-
suming the subset of subareas in each zone has the same income. IN summarizes
the cumulative size of differentials between subareas that are within the same
geographic zone, or intra-zonal inequality.4
There are two differences between this chapter’s approach to look at intra-zonal
differentials and that of a standard additive decomposition of variance (discussed
in more detail in section 3).5 First, this chapter’s approach is based on a mutually
exclusive and exhaustive partitioning of income differentials (or pairs of subareas),
not the subarea units themselves (Shorrocks, 1982). This is important so we can
down. Therefore, the link between economic suffering and a geographically aggregate inequality
measure, which ignores this notion of interdependence, can be considered opaque (Sen and
Foster, 2006).
4W is normally used to denote a within component, but I use the notation IN so as not to
confuse this with the way how I denote a spatial weights matrix using W.
5Sen and Foster (2006, p.156-157) explains a difficulty regarding interpretations based on
additive decomposition:“As a word of caution, though, we might note that sometimes questions
that are plausibly asked may not be sensibly answerable. (For example, ‘how much of the
breakdown of this marriage was the responsibility of the husband and how much of the wife,
adding up exactly to a total responsibility of 100%?’)... .”
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simultaneously account for geographic and social positions to describe emerging
inequalities. Second, this chapter’s approach based on equation (2.7), accounts
for the average size of a subset of differentials, while a standard decomposition
approach, equation (2.8), accounts for the proportion of total dispersion, T , linked
to different partitions of the distribution of incomes.
Ordinarily, an additive decomposition approach to explain geographic changes
in inequality focuses on the movement in the proportion of total dispersion at-
tributable to an inter-zonal partition Bt/Tt, equation (2.8). An observation of
B2/T2 > B1/T1, could be interpreted as an increase in the importance of the extent
of the inter-zonal pattern for describing inequality in a society. In this chapter’s
approach, a similar observation of an upward movement, such as V2(W) > V1(W),
could be interpreted as an increase in the acuteness of an inequality pattern com-
pared to the general pattern in society. Both could be viewed as complementary
ways to provide evidence of increasing institutional or economic policy unfairness
towards some parts of society in favor of others.
Kanbur and Zhang (1999) use an additive decomposition approach to examine
the changing importance of using rural-urban and coastal-inland zonal divisions
to describing inequality in China. For their rural-urban results, they partition
China into 56 subareas by dividing each of the 26 provinces into one of two zones,
a rural zone or an urban zone. They then decompose total inequality into 3
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parts: 1) within-rural differentials, 2) within-urban differentials, and 3) between-
urban-rural differentials. They report interesting results showing that, while the
urban-rural divide has consistently accounted for more inequality, in recent years
there is a growing importance of understanding China’s income inequality in terms
of a coastal-inland division.
Rey (2004a) introduces an inferential method that can assign statistical sig-
nificance to descriptive results such as Kanbur and Zhang (1999)’s observation
of increasing coastal-inland disparity in China. Instead of focusing on how the
levels of a decomposition measure such as B/T change over time, Rey (2004a)’s
approach is to examine the statistical significance at each time period for a given
partitioning framework that the inter-regional inequality measure B is based on.
He defines an index p(B) as:
p(B) = Pr(B∗ > BR) (2.9)
Pr is used to denote a percentile conception of a probability function. This
probability function provides pseudo-significance levels by counting the percentage
of times that the observed measure B∗ is greater than random realizations BR
calculated from randomly rearranging how each subarea is indexed by a geographic
zone. The randomization process can be thought of as shuﬄing the subareas on a
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map. The randomly computed realizations, BR, are sorted to build an empirical
distribution upon which to assess the significance of the size of an observed value
of B.
The approach adds informational value to complement the decomposition ap-
proach: B/T could decrease while still remaining statistically significant and, vice
versa, it could also move upwards while remaining statistically insignificant.
What neither Kanbur and Zhang (1999)’s nor Rey (2004a)’s approaches can
account for is whether income differentials are significantly changing between rural
and urban people living in proximity to one another, within the same provinces
(or zones), as I have termed inter-social, intra-zonal inequalities, the perspective
of this chapter.
2.3 Formulation
In this section, I propose a framework to formulate a class of inter-social,
intra-zonal inequality measures. Instead of partitioning subareas of a country into
regional subgroups, as is conventional for an additive-decomposable approach, I
partition pairs of subareas. The key of this chapter’s approach is to represent how
all N × (N − 1) pair-wise income differentials are associated with one another,
jointly based on the geographic and social position of each subarea. From this
representation I formulate a new class of intra-zonal, inter-social measures.
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The measures are based on three types of data matrices: D, G, and Sk,l.
D = [dij] denotes a matrix of the squared differences between all the income
values (defined in equation 2.3). D can be decomposed into two components,
spatial and aspatial (equation 2.6). We can decompose the spatial component
further with two matrices. G = [gij] represents pairs of subareas i, j, that are
located in the same geographic zone. Sk,l = [sij] represents pairs of subareas i, j
that are referenced by the social positions k, l.
For this chapter’s empirical illustration I use the common zonal location of
two neighborhoods within the same metropolitan zone to specify elements of G,
as follows.6
gij

1, if i and j are in the same zone
0, otherwise.
Likewise, different social matrices can be defined, as follows.
sij

1, if i, j ∈ {k, l}
0, otherwise
where {k, l} is a pair-set for the indices of groups of areas defined by social po-
6More generally, other potential studies could define such geographic zones based on different
concerns (villages located in the same protected forest, schools in the same school districts, tribes
in the same village, etc.)
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sitions {k, l} = {{1, 1} , · · · , {np, np}}, where np is the number of social positions
considered. In this chapter’s empirical illustration the social positions I use to
label neighborhoods of the United States are Black, White, Latino, and Mixed.7
Before one can define social similarity Skl some prior notion of relevant social
positions is needed. Each society has its own social positions that are expected to
play a role in the economic capabilities of its citizens, such as gender, caste, tribe,
culture, and inherited occupation (Rawls, 1971).
Spatial structure can then be simply defined jointly using geographic and social
information, as follows:
W = G Sk,l (2.10)
In general terms, W represents one’s prior notion of how the intersection
of certain attributes affects how some income differentials are more important
than others. Specifically, for this chapter’s empirical illustration, W, denotes
differentials across areas in the same zone associated with the a particular pair-
set of social groups {k, l}.
7In this chapter’s empirical illustration, I constructed a class of 10 inter-social, intra-zonal
measures. In this case np = 4 so then the total number of possible combinations of racial
pair-sets is 10 given by (
np
2
)
=
np!
2!(np − 2)!
This alludes to the need to have a small number of social positions when using this chapter’s
approach so that the interpretation of the results can be tractable.
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Then the elements of W can be understood as:
wij

1, if i, j ∈ {k, l}, and in the same zone
0, otherwise
The notational value of equation (2.10) is in how the spatial weights matrix
W simplifies representing spatial structure defined jointly using labels of social
and geographic position.
2.3.1 Decomposition
Next, I explain how we can represent a mutually exclusive and exhaustive
partitioning of income differentials. D, representing the universe of differentials,
can be decomposed into two components representing intra-zonal and inter-zonal
differentials, as follows:
D = DG + DG+ (2.11)
The intra-zonal component DG can be further decomposed into a set of matrices
Sk,l representing inter-social relations, as follows:
DG = DG (S11 + S12 + ...+ S1k...+ Snp,np) (2.12)
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Using this spatial perspective, we can compare subsets of income differentials
in terms of their proportion (P) to total inequality and in terms of their average
(A) size. The next two measures below contrast the size of income differentials in
terms of social positions to understand intra-zonal income inequality.
(P) The proportional approach is given by
Pk,l =
1(DG Sk,l)1′
1(DG)1′ (2.13)
(A) The average approach is given by
Ak,l =
V (G Sk,l)
V (G)
(2.14)
The next two measures below contrast the size of income differentials in terms
of the shared geographic positions of pairs of neighborhoods within the same zone
to understand inter-social income inequality.
(P) The proportional approach is given by
Pk,l =
1(DG Sk,l)1′
1(D S)1′ (2.15)
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(A) The average approach to be given by
Ak,l =
V (G Sk,l)
V (S)
(2.16)
The difference between the above pairs of equations, (2.15 and 2.16) versus
(2.13 and 2.14), is how they account for geographic and social positions. Equations
(2.15) and (2.16) account for the relative importance of geographic positions for
characterizing inequality between different social groups. Equations (2.13) and
(2.14) account for the relative importance of social positions for characterizing
inequality amongst people in the same geographic vicinity. This is seen in how
the denominator switches between Sk,l and G, respectively.
In the empirical illustration below, I explore how proportional measures, equa-
tions (2.13) and (2.15), and the new average measures, equations (2.14) and (2.16)
present two different pictures of changing neighborhood inequality in the United
States. Additive decomposition approaches are useful in evaluating the extent of
success of an inequality reducing policy in a proportional sense for different parts
society (Sen and Foster, 2006). In contrast, the average approach here could be
useful in monitoring trends regarding the intensity or acuteness of a subset of
income gap changes.
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Adopting this chapter’s notation, Geary’s c statistic appears as follows:
c =
V (G)
2V
(2.17)
The average measures of equations (2.14) and (2.16) have a form like that
of Geary’s c statistic (Cliff and Ord, 1973). In a sense, one could think of this
chapter’s measures as a translation of Geary’s c to analyze inequality instead of
spatial clustering. There are two differences between this chapter’s new inequality
measures and standard applications of Geary’s c statistic, or more generally, of
other cross-product spatial statistics (Getis, 1991). First, in the new inequality
measures both geographic and social positions define the spatial weights matrix
W. Second, the new inequality function describes pairwise income differentials,
not income levels, between different types of neighborhoods.
The variogram function in geostatistics also describes pairwise differentials.
In continuous space, the variogram shows at what distance bands high spatial
dependence dissipates into randomness (Cressie, 1991). The proposed metric of
this chapter uses weights defined in discrete space.
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2.3.2 Significance of social and geographic labels
The notion that large inter-social, intra-zonal differentials are substantively
important, in the sense that they could affect how economic resources are locally
distributed, does not necessarily equate to a particular inter-social, intra-zonal
spatial perspective being empirically relevant. To assess the empirical relevance
of a {k, l} inter-social, intra-zonal measure, there are two types of tests we can
use. In both tests the objective is to estimate the likelihood that the new mea-
sures are larger in size than similar ones based on random selection from more
aggregate subsets of income differentials: (i) {k, l} inter-social differentials for
the entire society, irrespective of geographic position, or (ii) all intra-zonal dif-
ferentials, irrespective of social positions. The idea is that these more aggregate
subsets of income differentials account for a simpler, more conventional view of
neighborhood income inequality to be challenged.
I extend Rey (2004a)’s inferential method (equation 2.12) that assess the sig-
nificance of inter-regional inequality B to assessing different types of inter-social,
intra-zonal inequalities defined by different W’s, as follows:
p(W) = Pr(V (W∗) > V (WR)) (2.18)
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W∗ is the actual observed spatial structure and WR its random realization after
randomly permutating the columns and rows of the matrix.
As a way to assess the value of the information in G conditional on S, or
vice versa, when defining spatial structure, W = G  Sk,l, I compute pseudo-
significance levels. To test the significance of a social pattern within intra-zonal
inequality, I use
p(S) = Pr(V (G∗  S∗k,l) > V (G∗  SRk,l)) (2.19)
To test the significance of a geographic pattern within a type of {k, l} inter-social
inequality, I use
p(G) = Pr(V (G∗  S∗k,l) > V (GR  S∗k,l)) (2.20)
The larger the likelihood that an actual change measurement is greater than
random realizations, then the more evidence we have to justify the use of the more
complex, spatially explicit measures. Specifically, a frequency close to 50 percent
means the social or geographic differentiation hold little value for a specific type
of inter-social, intra-zonal inequality, while a frequency closer to 100 or 0 percent
conversely signifies the opposite, that social or geographic information is valuable
in differentiating between types of income inequality patterns.
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This randomization is different than Rey (2004a)’s weights matrix permuta-
tions. Each random realization, V (GR  S∗k,l), is not equivalent to randomly
rearranging both the rows and columns of the W matrix; we are not randomizing
income values across tracts. We keep the representation of at least one compo-
nent of how we structure the observational space, W, fixed. For equation 2.20,
the social structure, S, is fixed, while we randomize the geographic zonal labeling
scheme within each social group. For equation 2.19, the geographic zonation of
the space, G, is fixed, while we randomize the social labeling scheme within each
zone.
2.3.3 Change
This chapter’s approach does not have the favorable property of subgroup
consistency. On the other hand, the new measures of the approach may reflect
changes in aspects of income inequality that subgroup consistent measure may
obscure. Sen and Foster (2006, p.157)’s explanation of subgroup consistency is as
follows.
Subgroup consistency requires that if male inequality rises with fe-
male inequality unchanged, then overall inequality must likewise reg-
ister an increase. More formally, if means and population sizes are
unchanged in going from x1 to x2, and from y1 to y2, then [sic. nota-
tion is modified to fit that used above in this chapter]:
IN(x2) > IN(x1) and IN(y2) = IN(y1) entail T (x2, y2) > T (x1, y1)
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Note that this property says nothing about the size of the overall in-
crease in inequality relative to the change in the subgroup–it is only a
directional correspondence. Indeed, the increase in subgroup inequal-
ity could be precipitous and the increase in aggregate inequality very
small, without violating the precept.
It is this ‘precipitous’ but proportionally small change, which Sen and Foster
(2006) mention above, that the inferential approach may be used to identify. To
illustrate the contrasting cross-sectional view point of the average approach com-
pared to a proportional approach based on an additive decomposition of variance,
consider a partitioning of income differentials within a city into two sets of neigh-
borhoods labeled Immigrant and Native. Say the average income gap between
Immigrant and Native pairs of neighborhoods is very large, making the V (W)
type measures larger than an aggregate variance statistic based on all areas in
the city, such as: 1 < V (W)/2V . Yet, at the same time, if there are very few
Immigrant neighborhoods in the city, then these Immigrant-Native differentials
may cumulatively make up a fairly small percentage of total income variance in
the city. So although an average measure, V (W)/2V , can be relatively big com-
pared to other spatial perspectives (or subsets of differentials), a proportional
measure, B/T , could simultaneously be fairly small compared to other possible
neighborhood partitions of the city.
46
A descriptive measure of percentage change between two time periods, 1 and
2, is:
V2(W)− V1(W)
V1(W)
. (2.21)
To understand how to identify a inequality pattern showing significant change,
let the change in inequality be given by
∆A = V2(W)− V1(W) (2.22)
Let random realizations be defined as follows.8
∆AR = V2(W
R)− V1(WR). (2.23)
An index measuring the significance of a change in the average size of a subset
of inter-social, intra-zonal differentials associated with W could then be seen as
8In a sense, such random realizations are analogous to how a stochastic σ-convergence process,
explained in Quah (1996a), may also change the relative sizes of different subsets of differentials.
The major difference is in the spatial randomizations being conditional on geographic or social
structure.
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follows.9
p(∆A) = Pr(∆A > ∆AR) (2.24)
Values from this equation describe how concordant the movement of a partic-
ular subset of income differentials is with income differentials selected randomly.10
2.4 Empirical Illustration
2.4.1 Data
I provide an empirical illustration of this chapter’s approach to describe inter-
social, intra-zonal inequality patterns using the income differentials between cen-
sus tract neighborhoods of the United States for the decadal periods 1980, 1990,
and 2000. I use data series at the tract unit level of analysis from the Census
Summary Tape File 3A. The key variable for this research is neighborhood in-
come and is based on census per capita median household income series at the
tract level, and is summarized in table 2.1. Table 2.2 shows the break down of
tracts by social groupings for each year.
9When using census data to define how neighborhoods are located within the same zones,
different W matrices will be needed to be specified for each period since the boundaries of
administrative zones are changed by government officials for each period.
10We are not testing if change in a measure represents substantive dispersion change, as
in studies such as Carree and Klomp (1997) and Lichtenberg (1994), but rather if change in
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Table 2.1: Mean of Household Median Incomes of tracts by social groupings
Partition 1980 1990 2000
All groups 18,566 33,953 47,462
White 20,936 39,027 56,370
Black 11,240 19,491 28,106
Latino 11,618 21,047 30,296
Mixed 16,052 32,380 46,882
Table 2.2: Census tracts counts by social groupings
Partition 1980 1990 2000
All groups 44,171 44,764 47,007
White 27,289 20,783 15,400
Black 37,87 3,977 4,149
Latino 903 1,453 2,469
Mixed 12,192 18,551 24,989
First, I labeled each tract as belonging to 1 of 4 census racial categories (Black,
White, Latino or Mixed), based on the majority of census survey responses from
households in each respective tract. If more than 2 of 3 households in a tract
identified themselves as Black or Latino (Non-White Hispanic) or if more than
90 percent of the households in a tract responded as White the tract was la-
beled accordingly. The remainder of the tracts were labeled Mixed. Social space
is differentiated by sorting pairs of tracts to define 10 mutually exclusive and
exhaustive inter-social income gap subsets: Black-Black, White-White, Latino-
a measure is significantly different than change based on a random grouping of subareas to
construct such a measure.
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Latino, Mixed-Mixed, Black-White, Black-Latino, Black-Mixed, White-Latino,
White-Mixed, Latino-Mixed.
It is important to note the labeling of census tracts by race was done separately
for each decade, in order to avoid comparing “apples with oranges”. Census tracts
grow, split, and join over the decades, and inter-migration happens among tracts.
These changes in the geographic system over time make it impossible to use the
same spatial weights for all time periods, since racial labels for tracts across 3
decades would be meaningless. Therefore, the spatial weights are different for
each time period, though the rules to define them are constant.
Naturally, if comparisons are to be valid across time, then there must have
existed reasonably consistent rules for defining the administrative areas of the
geographic system being studied. For instance, the rule of the United States
census tracts are “Designed to be relatively homogeneous units with respect to
population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions, census tracts
average about 4,000 inhabitants.”(Census Bureau, 2013).
I labeled each neighborhood as belonging to 1 of 238 metropolitan zones. For
1980, 1990, and 2000, I used a consistent set of metropolitan zones constructed
based on the census 2000’s metropolitan area county building block definitions.
The following criteria were used to select the tracts used in the analysis. To
reduce the chance of outliers with extreme income values, tracts needed at least
50
300 households and have a median household income of 2499 dollars in 1980.
To try to consistently compare income differences between urban populations,
each tract needed to be within a county defined by the census as being part of
a metropolitan area consistently for all three decades. Therefore, information for
county units was key to determining how metropolitan zones were defined; To be
a metropolitan zone in the analysis, metropolitan areas needed to be composed
of counties consistently belonging to a urban areas for all three decades. This
chapter’s analysis includes as geographic zones less metropolitan areas (n = 238)
than is officially reported existing in the country (n = 267, for 1990 and 2000
censuses). 13 New England metropolitan areas are also excluded because they are
aggregated from towns and cities instead of county building blocks. 4 metropolitan
areas in Puerto Rico are excluded. The remaining 12 did not meet one of the
criteria.
As a reminder, in the chapter, I use the term income gap to refer to the
squared difference between the logarithm of median household incomes of a pair
of neighborhood tracts. An intra-metro gap describes differentials associated with
tracts sharing the same metropolitan zone.
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Table 2.3: Comparing two descriptions of intra-metropolitan neighborhood in-
equality: Additive decomposition versus chapter’s new approach
Inter-social, intra-metro measures divided by same class of intra-metro measure.
In parentheses are percentages an actual measurement is greater than random realizations.
Proportions Averages
Income gap subset 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Intra-metro Black-Black 1 2 1 0.99 (4) 1.20 (78) 0.90 (0)
Intra-metro Black-Latino 0 1 1 0.82 (0) 1.04 (15) 0.78 (0)
Intra-metro Black-Mixed 8 12 15 1.14 (100) 1.43 (100) 1.32 (100)
Intra-metro Black-White 25 19 12 2.06 (100) 2.29 (100) 2.10 (100)
Intra-metro Latino-Latino 0 0 1 0.39 (0) 0.41 (0) 0.41 (0)
Intra-metro Latino-Mixed 1 3 7 0.96 (34) 1.10 (100) 1.17 (100)
Intra-metro Latino-White 7 6 5 2.35 (100) 2.43 (100) 2.49 (100)
Intra-metro Mixed-Mixed 8 20 30 0.71 (0) 0.70 (0) 0.80 (0)
Intra-metro White-Mixed 34 29 25 1.07 (100) 0.94 (0) 0.98 (0)
Intra-metro White-White 16 8 4 0.50 (0) 0.48 (0) 0.44 (0)
Percentages are based on 1000 realizations from randomly shuﬄing racial labels.
Percentages close to 0 and 100 indicate significance, close to 50 insignificance.
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2.4.2 Results
The results in the left-hand side columns in table 2.3 show the proportions of
total intra-metro dispersion attributable to different inter-social income differen-
tials calculated from equation 2.15. On the right-hand side columns are average
inter-social gap results calculated from equation 2.16. In the parentheses are the
percentage of times these actual measures were greater than random realizations,
based on shuﬄing social labels, using equation 2.19. The table illustrates how the
new approach adds information to the picture of changing neighborhood inequality
given by an additive decomposition approach using the same spatial perspectives.
The main empirical difference is that the additive decomposition highlights the
increasing size of the proportions of inequality attributable to differentials associ-
ated with Mixed neighborhoods, increasing from 51 percent in 1980 to 77 percent
in 2000. But this decomposition picture hides how the most acute intra-metro
income differentials are associated with Latino-White neighborhoods. Looking
down the rows of table 2.3 we see that the average Latino-White gap is the high-
est for all three decades. In contrast, from a proportional perspective it does not
appear substantial, and it moves in the opposite direction.
The results in table 2.4 compare the average size of a inter-social, intra-metro
gap to the average of the corresponding aspatial inter-social gap, calculated using
equation 2.14. By aspatial I refer to those subsets of income differentials chosen
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Table 2.4: Geographic inequality patterns: Average inter-social, intra-metro gap
divided by average inter-social gap, irrespective of geography
In parenthesis is percentage actual measurement is greater than random realization.
Income gap subset 1980 1990 2000
Intra-metro Black-Black 1.03 (70) 0.88 (2) 0.97 (34)
Intra-metro Black-Latino 1.07 (82) 0.99 (47) 1.07 (94)
Intra-metro Black-Mixed 0.93 (2) 0.77 (0) 0.90 (0)
Intra-metro Black-White 1.11 (100) 0.97 (17) 1.09 (100)
Intra-metro Latino-Latino 0.71 (1) 0.65 (0) 0.88 (7)
Intra-metro Latino-Mixed 1.08 (87) 0.96 (20) 1.18 (100)
Intra-metro Latino-White 1.66 (100) 1.63 (100) 1.88 (100)
Intra-metro Mixed-Mixed 0.92 (1) 0.74 (0) 0.95 (1)
Intra-metro White-Mixed 1.23 (100) 1.05 (100) 1.22 (100)
Intra-metro White-White 0.90 (0) 0.75 (0) 0.77 (0)
Percentages are based on 1000 realizations from randomly shuﬄing metro labels.
Percentages close to 0 and 100 indicate significance, close to 50 insignificance.
regardless of whether they belong to the same geographic zone or not. In paren-
theses is the percentage of times an actual measure was greater than its random
realizations, calculated using equation 2.20. Comparing table 2.4 to table 2.3
shows that the social positions of neighborhoods is more important in describing
intra-metro inequality than their geographic positions are in describing inter-racial
inequality, as might be expected. Nevertheless, for describing inter-social inequal-
ity, intra-zonal structure does have significance for most social pairs. This is most
evident with how much larger the Latino-White inequality is for neighborhoods
located in the same metropolitan areas compared to the universe of Latino-White
differentials. This result shows how using just a social perspective, ignoring the
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geographic one, underestimates the size of the income disparity between Latino
and White neighborhoods in the same cities.
The results in table 2.5, calculated based on equation 2.21, and describe the
percentage change in the average income differentials over the decadal periods for
different subsets of differentials. Looking down the rows illustrates how differently
changes have occurred based on the spatial perspective taken, ordered as sets of
types of measures from most to least aggregate. The clearest example of discor-
dance is seen in how half the intra-metro measures (bottom rows) for the decadal
change between 1990 and 2000 move down and half moved up. Between 1980
and 1990 it appears neighborhood inequality consistently rose from almost all the
measures, but was greatest for differentials associated with Black neighborhoods.
As an example of the value of jointly accounting for social and geographic po-
sitions, the inequality reducing change in the average income gap associated with
pairs of White-Mixed neighborhoods located in the same metropolitan neighbor-
hoods is masked by contemporaneous inequality enhancing change of both the
pure intra-metropolitan and the aspatial White-Mixed measures. Likewise, the
results show that the inequality reducing change associated with Black neighbor-
hoods between 1990 and 2000 is masked by the intra-metropolitan measure. In
addition, the inequality enhancing change associated with Latino neighborhoods
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Table 2.5: Evolving Neighborhood Income Inequality from Different Spatial Per-
spectives: Percentage change in the average size of a subset of income differentials
Income gap subset 1980-1990 1990-2000 1980-2000
Universe of Neighborhoods 34 -7 24
Intra-metro, all social pairs 10 6 17
Inter-social, irrespective of geographic position
Black-Black 55 -28 11
Black-Latino 50 -27 10
Black-Mixed 66 -16 39
Black-White 39 -14 19
Latino-Latino 27 -22 0
Latino-Mixed 42 -9 29
Latino-White 16 -7 8
Mixed-Mixed 34 -8 24
White-Mixed 14 -6 7
White-White 29 -5 22
Inter-social, intra-zonal
Intra-metro Black-Black 33 -21 5
Intra-metro Black-Latino 39 -21 10
Intra-metro Black-Mixed 38 -3 34
Intra-metro Black-White 22 -3 18
Intra-metro Latino-Latino 15 6 23
Intra-metro Latino-Mixed 26 12 40
Intra-metro Latino-White 14 8 22
Intra-metro Mixed-Mixed 8 19 29
Intra-metro White-Mixed -3 9 6
Intra-metro White-White 7 -3 4
Inequality change over time as a percentage of the previous period’s value.
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Table 2.6: Changing geographic patterns of neighborhood inequality
Percentage of times change in measure is greater than change in random realization.
Income gap subset 1980-1990 1990-2000 1980-2000
Intra-metro Black-Black 3 89 25
Intra-metro Black-Latino 20 86 52
Intra-metro Black-Mixed 0 100 24
Intra-metro Black-White 0 99 41
Intra-metro Latino-Latino 25 99 89
Intra-metro Latino-Mixed 9 100 86
Intra-metro Latino-White 41 99 95
Intra-metro Mixed-Mixed 0 100 82
Intra-metro White-Mixed 0 100 31
Intra-metro White-White 0 73 0
Percentages are based on 1000 realizations from randomly shuﬄing metro labels.
Percentages close to 0 and 100 indicate significance, close to 50 insignificance.
during the same period is masked by the corresponding aspatial, inter-racial mea-
sures (except the Black-Latino pairing).
Based on equation 2.24, tables 2.6 and 2.7 list pseudo-significance levels for
the inter-social, intra-zonal change measures using random shuﬄing of geographic
and social labels, respectively. Table 2.6 lists the percentage of times change in
the actually observed inter-social, intra-zonal measures are greater than randomly
simulated intra-zonal realizations. These values give us a picture of the relevance
of intra-zonal patterns in changing inequality. For both decadal periods there exist
significant differences in change, but in opposite manners. Between 1980 and 1990
intra-metro inequality changed to a lesser degree than the rest of the country for
all pairs, and significantly so for about half the pairs. Between 1990-2000 the
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Table 2.7: Changing social patterns of neighborhood inequality
Percentage of times change in measure is greater than change in random realization.
Income gap subset 1980-1990 1990-2000 1980-2000
Intra-metro Black-Black 97 0 0
Intra-metro Black-Latino 100 0 5
Intra-metro Black-Mixed 100 0 100
Intra-metro Black-White 69 38 58
Intra-metro Latino-Latino 82 16 58
Intra-metro Latino-Mixed 100 21 100
Intra-metro Latino-White 82 30 68
Intra-metro Mixed-Mixed 96 100 100
Intra-metro White-Mixed 00 100 0
Intra-metro White-White 00 75 0
Percentages are based on 1000 realizations from randomly shuﬄing racial labels.
Percentages close to 0 and 100 indicate significance, close to 50 insignificance.
pattern of change was the opposite, intra-metro neighborhood inequality rose to
a higher degree than the average for aspatial inter-social differentials.
In table 2.7 we see that although the intra-metro, inter-social inequality move-
ments appear concordant in table 2.5, the social labels I use still hold informational
value in explaining variations in change.
Below I summarize some key results.
• Between 1980 and 1990, as an example of the value of jointly (or simultane-
ously) accounting for social and geographic positions, the inequality reduc-
ing change in the average income gap associated with pairs of intra-metro
White-Mixed neighborhoods is masked by inequality enhancing change of
both the socially aggregate intra-metropolitan measure and the correspond-
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ing aspatial White-Mixed measure. Also between 1990 and 2000, Latino-
White income differentials within the same metro zones increased 8 percent,
but simultaneously went down -7 percent for the subset of all Latino-White
pairings, irrespective of metro zone.
• Between 1980 and 1990, Black neighborhoods were associated with the
largest inequality enhancing changes. This increase was significantly greater
for aspatial differentials than for intra-metro differentials.
• In reversal, between 1990 and 2000, Black neighborhoods were associated
with the largest inequality reducing changes.
• As an example of discordance, changes between 1990 and 2000 in intra-metro
inequality were discordant across social pairs; 5 measures moved up and 5
down.
• Between 1990 and 2000, Mixed neighborhoods were associated with the
largest inequality enhancing changes.
• Significant for all decades, the strongest inequality pattern is associated
with intra-metro White-Latino neighborhoods. An additive decomposition
of variance masks this result. The results also show that spatial or intra-
metro White-Latino neighborhood inequality is significantly greater than
aspatial White-Latino inequality.
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Sociology literature
There exist in the sociological literature two important and competing ex-
planations of the poor economic performance of inner city Black neighborhoods
during the 1980’s that are linked to two different mechanisms of social isolation of
poor central city Black areas.11 For Massey and Denton (1993), segregation is pri-
marily an effect caused by unfair institutional policies in society towards Blacks.
For Wilson (1987b), segregation occurs not so much from exogenous forces, but as
part of a larger complex social and economic process where the important social
split to look at is not just Black and White, but Black Middle class and Black
Poor. Wilson (1987b) stresses social isolation of poorer urban Blacks is based in
large part by the out-migration of middle class Blacks. Though the results here
do not provide evidence favoring one theory over the other, they do describe a
11For neighborhood units of analysis, Blau (1977, p.168-69)’s work emphasizes the importance
of looking at the intersection of social and geographic space as follows.
“Despite the fact that most social associations occur within com-
munities, group and status barriers to social associations within com-
munities inhibit them less that such barriers among communities. The
apparent paradox results from the influences of the spatial distribution
on social associations. Group and status barriers to social associations
within communities are attenuated by the counteracting effect of phys-
ical propinquity, whereas group and status differences among commu-
nities constitute barriers to social associations that are reinforced by
spatial segregation”.
Blau (1977)’s understanding of space and inequality helps understand the relevance of the inter-
social, intra-metro spatial perspective.
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situation of increased neighborhood income inequality in the 1980’s that is em-
pirically consistent with both Wilson (1987b) and Massey and Denton (1993) of
increased Black-Black and Black-White neighborhood income differentials.
The result of increased inequality associated with intra-metro Black neigh-
borhoods is also consistent with Jarkowsky (1997)’s results.12 Jarkowsky (1997)
interprets his results as support for Wilson (1987a)’s hypothesis of the sociological
importance of the out-migration of Black middle class families to suburbs from
central city Black neighborhoods in the 70’s and 80’s as a factor to their increased
poverty. This chapter’s results also show that the rise in intra-metro Black in-
equality was significantly less than the rise in aspatial Black inequality. This result
is consistent with how Jarkowsky (1997) descriptively emphasized that the rise
in poverty amongst urban Black neighborhoods in the 80’s was not broad based
but concentrated in particular cities, such as old industry cities in the Midwest.
What is left uncertain is how we explain the partial reversal: Between 1990 and
2000 the largest inequality reducing changes are associated the intra-metro and
12Jarkowsky (1997)’s results are based on what he terms a Neighborhood Sorting Index. It is
calculated for each city separately. It uses the ratio of two variance statistics of income in a city:
one of per capita median incomes across census tracts, the other of the income of households.
The Index is intended to capture the degree of economic segregation of households by census
tracts within a city. Though his Index accounts for intra-metro income differentials between the
same races it does not account for differentials across races. Another difference between this
chapter’s results and Jarkowsky (1997)’s is that this chapter’s approach is geographically global
in the sense that the measures account for subareas across a broad range of geographic zones
and his measures are based on subareas in an individual city. Further, this chapter’s approach
has a probabilistic basis to test for significance.
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aspatial Black neighborhood differentials. This chapter’s approach complements
the results of Jarkowsky (1997) by providing results in the context of other inter-
racial changes, and by having an inferential basis to compare intra-metro versus
aspatial changes.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
In summary, this chapter presents an empirical approach to assess economic
inequality that accounts for the average size of the income differentials between
different socially and geographically defined subsets of neighborhoods. Substan-
tively, I argue that it is important to assess changes in inequality between different
social groups that are located in the same geographic zones, because changes in
such differentials may have distinct consequences on a community’s capability to
obtain certain locally bound economic resources, such as health care or education.
The inferential approach for testing the informational value of incorporat-
ing spatial information (geographic and social references) is an extension of Rey
(2004a)’s spatial randomization method. Empirically, the new approach presented
here can identify a significant pattern of change in the relative incomes between
two social groups occurring contemporaneously across many geographic zones of
a society. The empirical illustration is based on income differentials between over
44,000 neighborhoods of the United States, referenced by 4 social groups (Black,
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White, Latino, and Mixed) and 238 metropolitan zones, for the 1980, 1990, and
2000 decadal census periods. The results illustrate how assessments of neighbor-
hood income inequality in the United States are sensitive to the spatial perspective
we use to formulate the inequality measures in terms of inter-racial and intra-
metropolitan groupings. The key advantage of the new exploratory approach is
that it may highlight in what parts of society new economic inequalities may be
emerging, which might otherwise be obscured by more aggregate approaches.
A potential avenue for future research is to define spatial weights in continuous
space rather than using discrete categories. For example, geographically, subsets of
health or crime differentials could be defined using distance from public facilities.
Socially, subsets of differentials can be defined in continuous space in terms of
observations on communication networks between places.
A disadvantage of this type of quantitative analysis is that the most important
types of observations relating to economic inequality may not have been recorded
in published statistical datasets that academic researchers are constrained to. For
instance, in Mexico and France there cannot be information distributed on racially
labeled social positions, since the concept officially cannot be used for differen-
tiating between its citizens. Another disadvantage is that in order to represent
intersectional notions of inequality is that we are limited to using only intersec-
tional notions that can be tractably translated into a computational function and
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can be based on available data. I use fairly crude functions based on census racial
and metropolitan information to label each neighborhood’s social and geographic
position. The binning of neighborhoods into social positions based on racial at-
tributes is based on conventional ideas of historical context rather than scientific
reasoning. Due to these disadvantages, this chapter’s approach should be viewed
as exploratory, hypothesis seeking, not a confirmatory, hypothesis proving (Rey
and Janikas, 2005; Tukey, 1977).
The significance of societal racial categories for describing income inequality
within cities of the United States is obviously not new. The types of quantitative
measurements presented in this chapter, however, might be useful in informing
discussions assessing economic inequality in other societies of the world where the
relevant social and geographic positions are less clear for analysts (though perhaps
obvious for lay people). If for the United States changing patterns of inter-racial,
intra-metro income inequality are masked by aggregate measures, then this raises
the question as to how similar inter-social, intra-zonal patterns in other societies
of the world are being obscured.
For instance, measuring world citizen income inequality, some academics have
recently argued that the painful consequences of recent economic changes expe-
rienced by people around the globe (which some believe are linked to new inter-
national trade arrangements termed ‘globalization’) are exaggerated. They use
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as evidence a downward change in the level of their aggregate dispersion metric.
The concern here is that such interpretations, based on the direction of change in
the level of income dispersion across individuals of a large geographic zone, such
as a country (Quah, 2002) or the world (Sala-i-Martin, 2006), mask disaggregate
patterns of inequality.
In a magazine article (Barro, 2002) titled “The U.N. is dead wrong on poverty
and inequality”, the economist Robert Barro argues that the assessment by the
U.N. in the 1999 Human Development Report contradicts the facts. He quotes the
U.N. report: “...The past decade has shown increasing concentration of income,
resources, and wealth.” He explains: “For world inequality, we can think of the
changes in two parts. The first is within countries, the second is across countries.”
Citing Sala-i-Martin (2006) as evidence, he says that over the past 30 years the
intra-country inequality rise has been ‘small’ compared to the inter-country in-
equality reducing changes. This chapter’s results for the United States suggest
a need, especially considering the context of violence and inequality, to picture
changing world income inequality not in terms of socially homogeneous countries,
but in terms of socially heterogeneous societies.
The most problematic consequences of economic changes, such as globaliza-
tion, may not only be related to an increase or decrease in overall aggregate levels
of inequality across countries or individuals, but to new inequality patterns be-
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tween social groups living side by side. For example, prominent in the sociological
literature, Wilson (1987a) documents some of the mechanisms generating unequal
consequences of industrial restructuring in the economy of the United States in
the 70’s and 80’s, focusing on the harsh absolute economic disadvantages that fell
upon urban Black neighborhoods of Chicago caused by changes in the relative
incomes of those communities. Aggregate measures of world citizen inequality
may be obscuring ongoing similar consequences that might be currently occur-
ring in other societies as an effect of analogous economic restructuring brought by
globalization.
As a conjecture, such obscurations may be especially pernicious when re-
searchers base their pronouncements of the direction of change in inequality on
empirical analysis of societies that are foreign to them; for such societies, it is more
difficult for researchers to appreciate the importance of accounting for variation
in historically significant social positions that might be masked by conventional
geographic aggregation of observations.
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Chapter 3
Assessing income inequality trends across
regions of a country
3.1 Introduction
Assessments of changes in the distribution of income across regions of a politi-
cal system can provide information for appraising those institutions that regulate
the conflicting economic interests of different geopolitical units of a political sys-
tem. Or, in other words, from a Rawlsian (Rawls and Kelly, 2001) perspective,
by looking at whether income dispersion moves up or down we are trying to
understand the fairness of one aspect of the political economic system.1 For this
chapter’s empirical illustration the units of analysis are states of the United States.
This chapter examines how ignoring spatial aspects of the data may obscure our
judgments of fairness in terms of regional income inequality.
1Rawls (1999, p.229) says “From the beginning I have stressed that justice as fairness applies
to the basic structure of society. It is a conception for ranking social forms viewed as closed
systems. Some decisions concerning these background arrangements is fundamental and cannot
be avoided. In fact, the cumulative effect of social and economic legislation is to specify the
basic structure”.
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To examine how spatial aspects of the data complicate matters, I incorporate a
spatial weights matrix into a convergence data generating process. The idea here
is to model how the distribution of state incomes can be changing both from an
aspatial catch-up convergence component and a random spatial error component.
The results of this spatial error model are then used to filter out the spatial
component from a time-series of income variance. The results of this chapter
show that the observed change in the dispersion trend of state incomes, from slow
convergence to divergence, in the 1980’s may not have necessarily been caused by
a large change in the underlying convergence process, but rather could plausibly
have been caused from a geographically patterned economic disturbance.
In addition to this introductory section, this chapter has four main sections.
The first, section 3.2, provides background on the empirical assessment of regional
income dispersion. Then in section 3.3, I discuss the normative relevance of as-
sessing income convergence amongst regions of a country. Section 3.4 describes
a method for incorporating a spatial weights matrix into assessments and section
3.5 presents an empirical result.
3.2 Background
Yit is the income per-capita of a region i at time t. We transform this series
as such yit = ln(Yit)−mean(ln(Yt)). Figure 3.1 shows a plot of this series for the
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Figure 3.1: Income per-capita convergence for 48 U.S. states: 1929 to 2000
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48 contiguous states of the United States. Visual inspection of the plot reveals an
overall downward decline in dispersion. If σ2t is the variance of the cross-sectional
productivity observations yit then we say that there is positive evidence of a σ-
convergenceprocess existing when we measure σ2t < σ
2
t−k, where k is some arbitrary
time span of years. This σ-convergence measure is an aggregate way to quantify
changes in dispersion seen in figure 3.1. After World War II, matching the pattern
of σ-convergence for US states, strong σ-convergence trends have been found for
the administrative regions of Japan and Europe (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004b).2
2Though this study uses variance, others statistics are used for σ-convergence such as the
Gini coefficient, the standard deviation, and the coefficient of variation. All are aggregate
ways to characterize the inequality dynamics of a set of regions, and each has advantages and
disadvantages (Sen and Foster, 2006, see Chap. 1). Yamamoto (2008)’s plot of σ-convergence
for the 50 US states using each statistic shows little variation in how they change over time,
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Ordinarily, researchers plot some income dispersion measure over time spans of
five to ten years to visually identify trends in σ-convergence. These plots suggest
to viewers how recent trends may be expected to evolve into the future, providing
information on the structure of an economy. One problem this research addresses
is how to disentangle random income fluctuations from a real economic structural
change, a secular trend. Although σ-convergence is mainly used as a descriptive
measure, researchers may be over confident, I argue, in how they interpret their
observations of a sudden change in a long run dispersion trend.
As an example of how researchers characterize change in a trend, Drennan
and Lobo (1999, p.358), describing a plot of the coefficient of variation for income
across metropolitan areas of the US from the mid-1970’s until 1989, say they note a
“decided upward trend...which suggests divergence”.3 Kanbur and Zhang (1999);
Chen and Fleisher (1996); Jian et al. (1996, p.692,147,5) do this for provinces in
China; Azzoni (2001, p.142,143) does this for states in Brazil; Drennan and Lobo
(1999, p.358) for metropolitan areas in the USA; Cuadrado-Roura et al. (1999,
p.40) for the NUTS Level II regions of Spain; Gezici and Hewings (2004, p.124)
for provinces of Turkey, Coughlin and Mandelbaum (1988, p.25) for states of the
in their overall trends, which is the main focus of this study. The advantage of the variance
measure of σ-convergence is its direct link to the concept of β-convergence.
3The authors follow-up with another article (Drennan et al., 2005) where they use a unit
root time-series test. This test will not be applied for the proposed research mainly the decadal
census data that will be analyzed does not have enough observation, degrees of freedom, required
for the time-series test.
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USA; Tortosa-Ausina et al. (2005) for provinces in Spain, and Nissan and Carter
(1999) look at the gap between non-metropolitan and metropolitan areas in the
US.
Historical trends in σ-convergence are also interpreted in terms of policy changes.
Sa´nchez-Reaza and Rodr´ıguez-Pose (2002) associate the open trade policies in
Mexico of GATT, during the 1980’s, and NAFTA, during the 1990’s, to increased
regional disparity trends. Prior to theoretically specified regression analysis, Rivas
(2007) uses movements in the Gini coefficient to support the evidence of increased
regional inequality during the 1990’s due to trade liberalization in Mexico.
Fan and Casetti (1997) use the aggregate increase in the income dispersion
across states of the United States in the 1980’s as evidence to make the strong
pronouncement that the ideas behind the Neoclassical economic convergence hy-
pothesis are obsolete. Their pronouncement is strong because it can be interpreted
in a normative manner: that the expected fairness associated with the structure
of the political economic system towards initially poor states of the United States
has changed and should be put into question. I will discuss this idea in the next
section.
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3.3 Relevance
In this section, I discuss how the regional convergence hypothesis can be linked
to the idea of normatively assessing unfairness. In particular, the focus here is on
how empirical matters become complicated because of how spatial patterns can
characterize how an income distribution evolves.
Some Marxist geographers have theorized that the profit interests of the owners
of capital are in line with preventing the convergence of poorer regions to richer
ones, (Massey, 1979). More simply, Marxist believe that the basic structure is
unfair towards regions that are poor at the start.4 Others emphasize how spatial
agglomeration forces (Krugman and Venables, 1995) may concentrate the most
productive high income earning activities into a few geographic market areas,
at the expense of peripheral regions leading to regional income divergence. Most
influential in the economic literature is Neoclassical theory’s prediction of regional
income convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004b).
As a conceptual aid, in order to represent changing patterns in the income gaps
amongst people living in pairs of geographic areas, i and j, I borrow Bernard and
Durlauf (1996, p.165)’s proposed two definitions of hypothetical ways the incomes
of people in different places can be thought of converging. They state that con-
4This discussion presumes we are dealing with a country characterized by competitive mar-
kets.
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vergence between members of a set of I economies may be defined analogously by
requiring that every pair within the set exhibits the defined types of convergence.
Below, Υ denotes all the information at time t. Their first definition (in reverse
order from their paper) says countries i and j converge if the long-term forecasts
of (log) per capita income, y, for both countries are equal at a fixed time t.
Definition 1: Convergence as closing the income disparity gap.
lim
T→∞
E(yi,t+T − yj,t+T |Υ) = 0 (3.1)
The σ-convergence measure is used as an aggregate, exploratory way to quantify
how a geographic income distribution changes to see how it matches Definition
1. The mechanism by which convergence according to Definition 1 will occur
is by poorer regions of the same country, which presumes they all have the same
steady-state productivity potentials, growing faster than their richer counterparts.
In other words, they will converge by catching up as defined as follows.
Definition 2: Convergence as catching up. If yi,t > yj,t then,
(yi,t+T − yj,t+T |Υ) < yi,t − yj,t (3.2)
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Presenting a catch-up mechanism, Definition 2 is based on the assumption of
diminishing returns to capital , which lowers the relative growth of a richer region
who is close to its steady-state productivity as compared to a capital poor region
(Solow, 1956).
The prediction associated with Definition 2 can be viewed as a test of the valid-
ity of Neoclassical theory’s characterization that poor economies within a country
have a natural tendency to catch-up to richer economies. Across a set of isolated
economies, the mechanism for the catch-up process is based on the assumption
of diminishing returns to capital of neoclassical economic theory.5 Across the set
of economies the prediction assumes geographically invariant population growth
rates, investment rates, and consumption preferences, which is often assumed to
be more probable for places within a country than across different countries. Also
for places within a country more than across countries the prediction is strength-
ened by greater interregional flows of capital and labor due to commerce laws,
as well as greater flows of knowledge due to language similarity and lower com-
munication costs. The theory says capital investments will gravitate over time to
poorer areas that lack capital because of the market incentive caused by higher
returns in these areas.
5Originally, this theory was mathematically formalized by Solow (1956) for variations over
time for one economy.
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The empirical evidence associated with Definition 1 can be viewed as a test of
the relevance of Neoclassical theory’s characterization of the economy. Even when
Definition 2 is met, given that random shocks can also alter the distribution of
regional income levels, there is no guarantee of absolute convergence according to
Definition 1.6
From the economist’s perspective the proclaimed reason for assessing regional
income distributions is not for appraising institutional fairness, but rather for
adjudicating the convergence hypothesis. The economist’s convergence hypothe-
sis, however, might also be thought of as an empirical tool for the assessing the
temporal aspect of Rawls (1999, p.53)’s Second or Difference Principle: “Second:
social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both reason-
ably expected to be to everyone’s advantage...”. A catch-up convergence process
matches Rawls (1999, p.78)’s reasoning of a situation of just inequalities in that
“Eventually the resulting material benefits spread throughout the system to the
least advantaged.” In Rawls (1999)’s context, he is referring to social classes,
but here I am referring to geographic areas. If regions that are initially poor are
expected to catch-up to richer regions, and gaps between all regions shrink, then
6In a sense, Definition 1 relates to time and Definition 2 relates to space. Definition 1
can be thought of as a way to characterize the consequences of a convergence process that is
consistently stable over time, where unexplained disturbances or shocks cancel themselves out
quickly enough to infer that decreasing income disparities will naturally evolve into the future.
And Definition 2 can be thought of as a way to characterize convergence being stable over
space with no polarization or groupings in the process occurring due to unsymmetrical spatial
structure between economic relations between geographic areas.
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one might say this is evidence that the basic structure of the political economy
is fair in terms of regional income disparity. The normative relevance of a jus-
tification of institutional structures based on the ideas of Neoclassical theory is
that they equate to a form of procedural justice for regional economies; In other
words, free market policies will automatically lead to the egalitarian goal of income
convergence across regions.
In understanding the relevance of empirical methods to measure economic in-
equality, the concern of theoretical adjudication is intertwined with Rawls and
Kelly (2001)’s concern regarding injustice in term of unfair institutional arrange-
ments. For instance, if people are confident in the empirical evidence supporting
theoretical predictions of Definition 1, of absolute or σ-convergence, then this
weakens social justice arguments in favor of the geographical targeting of develop-
ment policies to raise human welfare. Likewise, while monitoring regional income
inequalities, an observation of a sudden change towards more income inequality
that is spatially patterned, not broad based, may not necessarily indicate under-
lying social injustices stemming from regional economic policies, but can still be
used to forewarn us of potential negative human welfare consequences that may
follow.
An ambiguous social justice question is raised by the fact that Definition 2 of
catch-up convergence is not a sufficient condition to reach Definition 1 of absolute
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convergence. The fact that these definitions are not equivalent has raised objec-
tions to using Definition 2 as the primary empirical evidence of the Neoclassical
convergence hypothesis (Quah, 1996a), believing that Definition 1 represents a
more relevant concept of convergence (Friedman, 1992).
For Sala-i-Martin (1996), empirical evidence of Definition 2 without Defi-
nition 1 could still be interpreted normatively as a positive outcome. Sala-i-
Martin (1996) defends the relevance of β-convergence assessments, of Definition
2, on normative grounds that the idea of catch-up convergence is linked to fair-
ness. He uses the analogy of a hypothetical situation where there are basketball
teams amongst whose overall performance dispersion may never lessen, absolute
or sigma-convergence of Definition 1, but at the same time, due to a fair draft reg-
ulating structure, weaker teams are expected show catch-up or beta-convergence
by reducing their performance gap with initially stronger teams over each time
span.7
Complicating the analysis of empirical evidence used to judge competing the-
ories are methodological problems inherent with the use of geographic units of
observation. What Sala-i-Martin (1996) ignores is that basketball teams can be
assumed to be independent of one another while this assumption is harder to make
for regional economies. At the regional scale, examples against an aspatial, broad
7Sala-i-Martin (1996) explains this in a footnote.
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based characterization of income gap movements are Quah (1996b)’s results of
an evolving bi-polar distribution of European regions and Rey (2002)’s results of
spatially conditioned inter-mixing of relative ranks for US states. These results
have important normative relevance. They allude to how evidence of a catch-up
convergence process among states or regions may obscure the possibility that the
income gaps between larger geographic clusters of interdependent regions may not
be converging even when there is evidence of β-convergence amongst what appear
to be independent areas or regions.8 The catch-up process of Definition 2 may
not be spatially invariant. Some of the mechanisms of economic convergence are
flows of investments, of people, and of innovative technologies between rich and
poor countries (Lucas, 2002). For regions of a country, these types of flows may
be regulated by geographic distance.
Spatial dependence occurs when observations are not independent of one an-
other, as usually assumed in standard statistical analysis (Anselin, 2003). For
instance, changes over time in the income levels of nearby communities may be
closely interrelated across space, so that over small time periods random geo-
graphically clustered economic shocks may obfuscate the monitoring of changes in
inequality measures associated with substantive changes in the economic climate
8For example, there could be three large geographic clusters of regions ranked as low, middle,
and high. Within each there can be catching-up convergence, but not between each. Neverthe-
less, an aggregate, aspatial assessment may characterize the situation as meeting Definition 2,
even though the situation does not seem to imply a fair economic structure for the initially poor
clusters of regions.
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of growth. In this chapter, I propose a method to deal with spatial autocorrelation
of disturbances when testing for σ-convergence, Definition 1.9
3.4 Spatial Weights
For this research, in an effort to use an empirical measure of change in income
inequality as a signal of change in economic inequality, I am concerned with differ-
entiating between the role of random economic disturbances, or noise, and the role
of an underlying β-convergence process. The key departure of this research from
the literature is that I do not assume that economic disturbances are independent
across subareas or regions of a country. In other words, a spatial process is be-
lieved to be generating the disturbances where by each region’s expected income
level is affected by the random economic shocks of its neighbors. How such chance
events that could be geographically clustered might include natural disasters or
periodic regional demand recessions.
9Another measurement problem in human geography, referred to as the Modifiable Areal Unit
Problem (MAUP), is that generalizations on the distributional characteristics from observations
at one spatial scale and zonal scheme cannot be carried over to other spatial scales and zonal
schemes (Oppenshaw and Taylor, 1991). In reference to Definitions 1 and 2 above the challenge
is to organize the set of I economies in order that the definitions are most relevant to the
concern at hand. For instance, a positive pronouncement of greater inequality amongst states
of the US may potentially hide a contemporaneous negative change of lesser inequality amongst
units based on another grouping such as rural versus urban areas or suburbs versus inner city
neighborhoods. Addressing issues of the MAUP, Rey (2004b) and Yamamoto (2008) both plot
inequality trends using different aggregation schemes. They also look at the portion of global
inequality that is accountable by intra-regional versus inter-regional inequality, alluding to the
way different income convergence mechanisms play themselves out at different spatial scales.
What is evident from these studies is that each aggregation scheme presents us with a different
cross-sectional view of inequality.
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Rey and Montouri (1999) also discuss this in terms of inefficient regression
estimates. They find that the idea of structural change in the speed of catch-up
convergence for states of the US, based on different regression estimates of the
strength of a β-convergence process for the first half and second half epochs from
1929 till 2005, may just be the effect of spatial error dependence. In contrast to
Rey and Montouri (1999), this research is not looking at spatial effects in terms
of how we estimate the over-all speed of a catch-up or β-convergence process, but
rather it looks at spatial effects in terms of how they may obscure judgments in
terms of how we impute a change in the structure of the economy due to a change
at one time span in the trend of aggregate dispersion.
Rey and Dev (2006a) also look at the role of spatial effects on σ-convergence,
but as a component of total variance for different slices of time, rather than the
change in variance between two time periods, the aim here. As another attempt
to control for common regional disturbances on convergence descriptions, Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (2004b) calculate what they term a shock variable based on how
each state’s disturbance is a function of its industrial structure (sector share) and
specify it within β-regressions over 10 year time spans. In time periods and for
geographic areas where industry sector data is not available the filtering method
proposed below could be an alternative approach to control for geographically
common shocks.
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3.4.1 Data Generating Process
Consider a process that characterizes the dynamics of economic productivities
for a set of regions and is approximated by:
yit = byi,t−1 + νit, t = 1, · · · , T, i = 1, · · · , N (3.3)
b we assume to be time and space invariant, and is estimated in this study using
OLS by pooling all the observations. νit represents the disturbances.
10 Say σ21 is
the variance of productivities at an initial time period, and σ2ν the variance of the
disturbances, then if b2 < 1−σ2ν/σ21, the productivities will converge over time, in
the sense of Definition 1, the gaps between all economies will shrink. Ordinarily, in
equation 3.3, ν, are assumed to be identical and independently distributed (i.i.d)
if this was assumed to be an aspatial process.
Spatial error
Disturbances can be modeled in vector notation as spatial autoregressive pro-
cess such as:
νt = (I− ρW)−1et, (3.4)
10Kennedy (2003) describes that one of the ways the existence of the disturbance term is
justified is for representing the omission of the influence of innumerable chance events.
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where νt is from equation 3.3 for each time period t, and et is a vector of unobserved
disturbances, which are i.i.d. For notational simplicity below, we denote the right-
hand side of the above equation as Ω which denotes the spatial multiplier matrix
that approximates the spatial structure by which shocks to the economies may
ripple back and forth across geographic borders as the following:
Ω = (I− ρW)−1. (3.5)
W denotes a binary contiguity matrix that has been row standardized.11
We can estimate the scalar ρ, which represents the strength of the dependence
between neighboring regions, with the following regression:
νt = ρWνt + et. (3.6)
In order to remove this cumulative effect over a time span k of all shocks in
the σ-convergence measure we formulate a filtered series, y∗i,t, combining equation
11The spatial weights matrix implemented here represents the geographic configuration of the
48 contiguous states of the United States. When off-diagonal elements of W before it is row
standardized are wij = 1 it refers to region i and j sharing a common administrative border.
Zeros are placed along the diagonal of W and also in all cells where no linkage exists in the
network amongst these pairs of regions. This matrix is meant to be a rough approximation of
a complex system of economic flows and forces which may influence how shocks in neighboring
regions are associated with one another
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3.3 and 3.4, using the following identity:
y∗i,t − yi,t =
N∑
i=1
T∑
k=0
bkωijei,t−k. (3.7)
The right-hand side of equation 3.7 represents the cumulative effect of each
past period k’s common shock from an initial period t− T up through the period
just before last year of the time span, t− 1, under consideration. ωij denotes the
elements of the spatial multiplier matrix Ω in equation 3.5. T denotes the total
number of years in the time span.
The final filtered series, y∗∗, is calculated by subtracting out the spatial com-
ponent from the original series, but including the aspatial residual component, eit
of 3.6, as follows.
y∗∗i,t = yi,t −
i=N∑
i=1
T∑
k=0
bkωijei,t−k + ei,t−k. (3.8)
3.5 Empirical Results
Using a spatial filtering approach the result shows that random disturbances
of a spatial nature might obscure how researchers identify changes in the ba-
sic structure of the economy. The top line of figure 3.2 represents the original
σ-convergence measure, the unfiltered variance of state per-capita income over
time, what would typically be observed, and the bottom lines are filtered series,
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Figure 3.2: Filtered versus unfiltered σ-convergence: 1980 to 1990, yt versus y
∗∗
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removing the cumulative effect of spatial autocorrelation of random disturbances
on the trend. The difference between the two bottom lines is that the higher (red)
one and is based OLS estimation of the spatial parameter and the lower (blue)
line is based on Maximum Likelihood estimation.
The empirical results here conflict with Fan and Casetti (1997)’s statement
that the idea of convergence to describe the regional economic system of the United
States has become obsolete. Assessing state income inequality as unfairness is
made more complex when we take a spatial view of how income gaps change.
There can simultaneously be an underlying convergence process that characterizes
the fairness of the overall institutional structure along with expected periods of
divergence due to random shocks over time that are not related to changes in
84
the convergence mechanism, but whose significance in terms of unfairness appears
magnified by spatial patterning. Nevertheless, even though this type of increased
dispersion may not be related to a change in the fairness of the basic economic
structure, it could still be linked to expected suffering on the part of some regions
negatively affected by the change.
3.6 Summary
In summary, when we try to describe changes with time-series plots in regional
inequality when the regions are interdependent, care should be taken in how we
interpret the results. The issue will be greater for geographic areas characterized
by high levels of spatial autocorrelation. For example, using the Moran’s I statis-
tic, significant autocorrelation has been found across 48 contiguous states of the
USA for each year of the time span between 1930 and 1995 (Rey and Montouri,
1999), across 136 NUTS2 level regions of the European Community for each year
between 1980 and 1995 (Le Gallo and Ertur, 2002), across counties nested within
the majority 12 of states of the USA between 1969 and 2000 (Janikas and Rey,
2005), and across states of Brazil from 1939 to 1996 (Mossi et al., 2003). The
filtering approach can be thought of as an exploratory tool in guiding norma-
12Janikas and Rey (2005) indicate 35 out of 48 states had significant clustering.
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tive interpretations of sudden changes in aggregate income dispersion trends of
geographic areas.
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Chapter 4
Assessing income segregation associated with
the design of a school attendance zone
4.1 Introduction
This chapter proposes a metric tied to a concern for identifying specific seg-
ments of a school attendance zone boundary that might act as barriers to a child’s
cooperative encounters with children of other income classes. The proposed met-
ric incorporates spatial structure by giving greater weight to income differentials
among blocks that are contiguous, to proxy the blocking of potential encoun-
ters by an attendance boundary. Borrowing from Rey (2004a), this chapter uses
spatial permutations for identifying local hot spots, where a boundary’s segment
appears to split areas by income size (hot spots in terms of statistically significant
high income differentials and not clustering as in Getis (2008)). It is important
to note, the aim of the metric proposed here, like chapter 2’s metric, is not to
inform a concern for the culprit of the boundary design, but rather to highlight
areas, in the spirit of exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) (Anselin and Getis,
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2010; Janikas and Rey, 2005), in terms of a concern for the effects of institutional
boundaries.
Concerns of unfairness as a cause are different from concerns of suffering as an
outcome or effect. To examine how the assessments of the institutional fairness
of attendance zone assignments may be clouded by voluntary residential sorting,
I divide the data generating process of geographic income distributions into two
components. One is spatial and not related to unfairness, the other is aspatial
and related to unfairness. For the former I approximate the residential voluntary
self-sorting of people by income with a spatial dependent data generating process.
The idea behind this was that observations of residential income clustering ap-
pear in the same way as simulated spatial autocorrelation patterns. An aspatial
income generating process was formulated to approximate the fair or just drawing
of attendance zones. The results show how there is a problem in that both spatial
and aspatial components both influence significance testing of inequality mea-
surements thereby obscuring judgments of whether segregation is due to random
residential sorting or unfair policies.
The issue of voluntary residential sorting does not impact measurements if we
explicitly make our concern one of outcomes. To illustrate the effects or outcome
of school boundaries, consider how Kozol (2005) associates large income gaps
between school zones of New York City as a cause of the unbalanced distribution
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of educational resources. Kozol (2005), in explaining the factors leading to the
desperate conditions of some school children in New York City, associates the large
median income gaps between school neighborhoods as a causal reason for why it
is harder for the poorer zones to offer competitive salaries and facilities to attract
the best teachers. Kozol (2005, p.46) gives as an example the median teacher
salary gap between schools in the poorer Bronx and the richer Queens as being
$46,000 queens versus Bronx $64,000 for the New York City 2002-3 school year.
He emphasizes that this excludes additional resources from private funding that is
often a part of the school salary budget that is not shown in public data records.
Another negative outcome of school boundaries is social isolation. To illustrate,
Kozol (2005, p.16) quotes a church pastor talking about children he works with
from the poorer schools of New York City: “They don’t have any friends who
are white children. When I take them with me sometimes to Manhattan to go
shopping at a store for something special that they want or to a movie on one of
their birthdays, and they find themselves surrounded by a lot of white kids, many
of the younger ones get very scared. It’s an utterly different world for them. In
racial terms, they’re almost totally cut off.” Attendance zone boundaries may act
as a barrier to potential inter-racial social interaction. Illustrating this in concrete
terms, in Kozol (2005, p.28) there is a quote: “It’s like we’re being hidden,” said
a fifteen-year-old girl named Isabel I met some years ago in Harlem. “It’s as if
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you have been put into a garage where, if they don’t have room for something but
aren’t sure if they should throw it out, they put it there where they don’t need
to think of it again.” Concern exists regarding the coupled relationship between
economic deprivation and social isolation (or exclusion) of some minority groups
in cities of the United States, especially through the school system (Wilson, 1987a;
Kozol, 1991).
The local spatial view taken in this chapter is that nearby pairs of neigh-
borhoods are more important to children’s potential encounters than far away
neighborhoods. From this local spatial perspective of a child’s perceptions, a lo-
cal measure of sorting due to particular segments of an institutional boundary can
be formulated. The empirical significance of this measure is that we can assess
inequality in terms of local suffering caused by local boundary segments instead of
focusing on assessing the institutional fairness of an entire school attendance zone
design. The new local measure can be seen as an exploratory approach that takes
a local perspective, or block by block perspective, to assess the role of segments
of an attendance zone boundary on inequality.
This chapter has three main sections. In section 4.2, I explain an approach for
incorporating a spatial view of inequality into segregation assessments. In section
4.3, I propose a new local measure. Then, in section 4.4, I explain how residential
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Figure 4.1: Hypothetical geographic space with a school zone, income realiza-
tions, and block-like subareas
sorting, in the form of spatial income autocorrelation, can affect our judgments
on the fairness of a school attendance zone design.
4.2 Spatial weights
Figure 4.1 illustrates the geographical relationships considered in this chapter
for describing how a zonal boundary affects inequality. The lattice shape replicates
a set of block-like subareas. Those blocks intersected by the circle and within the
circle denote blocks assigned to the school in the middle of the lattice. The values
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within each block represent income values. I assume that children from blocks
assigned to the same school zone will form a social group since they are more
likely to interact with one another than otherwise. A complementing assumption
is that if there is no school zone children from different blocks would interact with
one another freely. Our inequality concern is whether the presence of this school
zone will structure children’s interactions in a way correlated to the income level
of their blocks.
The approach here is to formulate a spatial inequality measure that accounts
for whether the average income gaps between blocks inside and outside the circle,
between the in-zone group and out-zone group, is more or less than the average
gap between all pairs of blocks; An advantage of the spatial inequality measure
to be formulated is that it can be used as a test statistic in spatial permutation
tests, which shuﬄe the assignment of subareas to a school, in order to gain an
idea of the statistical significance of a zonal design on inequality.1
To begin, we can consider that the total variance based on all the subareas
can be decomposed into two parts: spatial and aspatial. In this case we use the
1Walzer (1983, p.215) says: “Randomness is the most obvious associative principle. If we
were to bring children together without regard to the occupations and wealth of their parents,
without regard to the political or religious commitments of their parents,...we might produce
perfectly autonomous educational communities.” Walzer (1983, p.215) just uses this idea of
randomness as an associative principle as a frame of reference for understanding the kind of
association advocated by leftist groups, but he does not support it. (He finds it extreme.) I
quote this not because of political reasons, but only because Walzer (1983)’s idea of randomness
as an associative principle conveniently matches what is being captured in the school income
inequality assessment approach being introduced here.
92
term spatial income gaps to refer to how the drawing of the geographic boundary
effects income inequality between the two resulting school groups of children, those
within and those outside of the school zone or circle in figure 4.1.
The approach is based on the variance statistic, V , which can be used to mea-
sure changes in income inequality. Consider distributions of a random variable,
Y , say per capita income, over n subareas (blocks), i = 1, ..., n, and let yi,t be
per capita income of subarea i at time t. Let the average level of income for all
subareas be y¯t =
1
n
∑n
i=1 yi,t, so that V is given by:
Vt = 1/n
n∑
i=1
(yi,t − y¯t)2 (4.1)
Evidence of reduced economic inequality is reflected in equation 4.1 declining,
such as:
V2 < V1 (4.2)
Ordinarily, the subscripts 2 and 1 above denote ending and starting time periods.
Here, instead of comparing inequality changes based on different income distri-
butions of Y at different time periods, as in chapters 2 and 3, in this chapter I
am concerned with how average income gaps, between areas inside a school zone
and outside a school zone change between other hypothetical school attendance
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assignments. Other hypothetical assignments can be represented as different re-
alizations of the spatial structure of social interactions, W , imposed by a school
zone design.2 So for this chapter, 2 and 1 in equation 4.2, denote different sets of
neighborhood school assignments.
As discussed in chapter 2, I use the term ‘income gap’ to refer to the squared
difference in the income between two subareas, such as:
dij = (yi − yj)2 (4.3)
where i, j are pairs of subareas. I believe it is important to differentiate amongst
income gaps based on the social distance between i, j (here, defined by the different
school zone assignments of each neighborhood) in terms of affecting the probability
that the associated communities compete with one another for economic resources.
Consider how a pair-wise computation of variance, based on income gaps,
leads to an equivalent result as equation 4.1. Income variance can be understood
as twice the average of all income gaps dij, as follows:
2V =
∑∑
dij
n(n− 1) (4.4)
2The notion of how different zonation schemes can lead to different results is also known as
the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP) (Oppenshaw and Taylor, 1991). Here, this situation
is not a problem but a useful informational property that allows us to assess the significance of
the inequality measure with the use of spatial permutation tests.
94
The denominator of the above equation, n(n−1), is the total count of all possible
gaps between subareas i, j. The numerator of the RHS of equation 4.4 is the sum
of the squared deviations of income gaps, from equation 4.3. 2V is equivalent to
the average of the universe of such gaps.
To see how spatial structure is implied by the variance statistic, it can be
considered as the weighted average of all income gaps.
2V =
∑∑
wijdij
n(n− 1) (4.5)
By defining all wij’s the same, as 1, reflects a situation of where all gaps are
considered the same regardless of heterogeneity of areal attributes such as school
assignment, race, or geographic position. The advantage of the pair-wise approach
to computing variance in equation 4.5 is the simplicity by which we can use weights
to represent spatial structure in a formulation of a inequality measure.
Squared income gaps between all n subareas in the population can be repre-
sented by a matrix D = [dij] (from equation 4.3). D can be decomposed into two
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components, spatial and aspatial:
2n(n-1)V = 1
′
(W D)1︸ ︷︷ ︸ + 1′(W+ D)1︸ ︷︷ ︸
spatial aspatial
(4.6)
W = [wij] represents the association between pairs of subareas i, j using binary
weights and its matrix complement (switching the ones for zeros) is W+. 1 is a
n by 1 vector of ones and 1
′
its transpose.
I define as a function V (·) based on the respective spatial weights matrix, as
follows:
V (W) =
1
′
(W D)1
nw
(4.7)
nw is the count of the non-zero, non-diagonal elements of W. The result of
equation 4.7 is simply the average size of each income gap represented by non-
zero elements of W. The result is also the equivalent to the spatial component of
equation 4.6. If the average size of all gaps for a set of subareas, I, is the same
as that for some subset of gaps represented by non-zero elements of W, then the
value of the aggregate measure V and the spatial measure V (W) would be equal,
1 = V (W)/2V , as a result of combining equation 4.5 and equation 4.7. The
general formulation of the spatial income inequality measure is based on this ratio
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of measures, the spatially significant gaps to all gaps. Next, I will discuss how
spatial structure W can be represented.
4.2.1 Formulation
D can be decomposed into two components, spatial and aspatial (equation
4.6). The challenge is how to represent the spatial structure, W , by which to
assess how a zone’s design alters social interactions of a place in an unbalanced or
unequal manner. The key of the approach is to represent how all N×(N−1) pair-
wise income gaps between areas are associated with one another, jointly based on
their geographic position, social position (or racial attribution), and school zone
assignment. To begin, we can understand this notion of spatial structure in terms
of three components that may be relevant in how a school zone affects relationships
amongst children, as follows.
• Neighborhood social interaction
• Barriers to interaction from school zones
• Racial dissimilarity
Below I represent these components as matrices.
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Neighborhood social interaction
G = [gij] represents pairs of subareas i, j, that are located in the same vicinity
that are influenced by the social division effect from a school zone design, and its
elements are defined as follows. Let N(i) denote the set of subareas j that are
considered neighbors of i.
gij

1, if j ∈ Ni
0, otherwise;
The notion of neighborhood N(i) means that there is more potential for en-
counters between children in i and N(i) to affect the socio-economic outcomes
of children in i than encounters between children in i and people in other subar-
eas, assuming no school zone effect.3 In an intuitive sense, this would mean that a
subarea in Montana should not be considered in the same neighborhood as a sub-
area in New York City in an assessment of a school zone. This type of geographic
interpretation, however, is legalistically important in more subtle situations such
as in the Detroit’s school desegregation case of Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.717
3More technically, we can understand a neighborhood with following notation.
i, I index and set of areas (city blocks), i = {1, · · · , n} ;
X spatial random process; (Xi social outcome)
wij
{
1, if P (xi) 6= P (xi|xj) , with i, j ∈ I and i 6= j
0, otherwise;
Ni {j|wij = 1} ;
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(1974) where there was a debate on whether subareas of the suburban ring should
be counted when assessing school racial imbalances in the central city (Delaney,
2001). As will be shown below, a set of local measures can be formulated with
different definitions for each subarea’s local space of potential social interaction,
Gi, that has the advantage of capturing a local resident’s perspective of how local
segments of a boundary appear to her to sort by income.
Barriers to interaction from school zones
Ck,l = [cij] represents pairs of subareas i, j not in the same school zone, and
its elements are defined as follows. =(·)f : i→ Z. is a function that tells what
zone z subarea i belongs to.
cij

1, if =(i) 6= =(j)
0, otherwise;
The weights cij can be used to account for how a zonal boundary divides the
people of subarea i from subarea j. By defining all cij’s the same, as 1, reflects a
situation of where there are no school zone boundaries to structure the encounter
or interactions of children from different neighborhoods.
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Racial Dissimilarity
R = [rij] represents social or racial dissimilarity between pairs of subareas i, j
and its elements as defined as follows.
℘(·)f : [a1, a2, · · · az]→ P . is a function that classifies a given subarea i into one
and only one social position, P based on areal attributes [a1, a2, · · · az].
rij

1, if ℘(i) 6= ℘(j)
0, otherwise;
Before one can define racial similarity some prior notion of relevant racial or
social positions is needed.4
Spatial structure of how income gaps are structured by a school zone can be
thought of as follows.
W = GCR (4.8)
The above racial, school zone and neighborhood spatial components can be
combined to form a single spatial weights matrix, W , whose elements can be un-
4Each society has its own social positions that are expected to play a role in the economic
capabilities of its citizens, such as gender, caste, tribe, culture, and inherited occupation (Rawls,
1971).
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derstood as follows.
wij

1, if ℘(i) 6= ℘(j) ∧ =(i) 6= =(j) ∧ j ∈ Ni
0, otherwise;
Using this spatial perspective, an advantage of a matrix representation of the
pair-wise relationships is the simplicity by which we can compare subsets of income
gaps in terms of their proportion to total inequality, and, the main focus here, in
terms of their average size.
I borrow Rey (2004a)’s spatial permutation method (explained in chapter 2
with equations 2.12 and 2.18) that he uses to assess the significance of inter-
regional inequality within a country and extend it to assessing the inequality
associated with the spatial structure imposed on children by the design of a school
zone. This spatial structure is defined by different W’s, as follows:
p(W) = Pr(V (W∗) > V (WR)) (4.9)
W∗ is the actual observed spatial structure and WR its random realization after
randomly permutating the columns and rows of the matrix. For the global in-
equality measures to form an empirical distribution of random realizations this is
equivalent to randomly shuﬄing the school assignments of subareas to a school.
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The smaller the likelihood that an actual realization’s measurement is greater
than random realizations means the more significant the evidence is towards as-
sociating a school zone design as having increased inequality for the geographic
zone being considered.5
A proportional measure of inequality linked to racial differences in the com-
position of neighborhoods is given by:
P =
1(DGCR)1′
1(DGC)1′ (4.10)
The difference in the numerator and the denominator is that the racial dissim-
ilarity matrix R is in the numerator. This measure provides a description of
the proportion of total income dispersion between in-zone and out-zone subareas
attributable to racial dissimilarity between those subareas.
This measure can be thought of as accounting for an intra-zonal, inter-social
perspective of inequality which can be extended more generally to encompass a
notion of intersectionality, highlighting how the most acute inequalities may exist
where particular societal positions intersect (Crenshaw, 1991), in particular, race
and income.
5In a sense, equation 4.9 captures the idea of Walzer (1983, p.215) of randomness as an
associative principle. See footnote 5 of this chapter.
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For the proportional measure we could compute pseudo-significance levels as
a way to assess the value of the information in C or R conditional on G when
defining spatial structure. For instance, to test the significance of a school zone
pattern of attendance assignments on income inequality compared to random
assignments, we use
p(S) = Pr(V (G∗ C∗) > V (G∗ CR)) (4.11)
The proportional measure is given to illustrate the advantage of using a decom-
posable spatial approach, but the focus of this chapter is on the average income
gap inequality measure.
An average approach is to measure global income inequality associated with a
school zone is given by
A =
V (GC)
V (G)
(4.12)
This measure is the ratio of the average squared income gap from 2 sets of pair-
wise relationships. The numerator accounts for the summation over the subset of
gaps between just subareas in the school zone and subareas out of the school zone.
In other words, we are referring to gaps between block subareas inside and outside
the circle in figure 4.1. In a sense, the denominator is a device to represent what
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the social associations would hypothetically be without the enforcement of school
attendance zones.6 The denominator accounts for the summation over all the set
of gaps between subareas of what can be considered the essential geographic area
of potential social encounters. In other words, we are referring to all pair-wise
relationships between block subareas in figure 4.1, regardless of the school zone
circle. The measure can be thought of as a useful as a ‘rule of thumb’ to analyze
the effect of school assignments on inequality.
The index of dissimilarity is considered the ‘work horse’ measurement in seg-
regation studies dealing with racial imbalances (Clotfelter, 2004). I will compare
a new local and the above global measure with it in simulations below to un-
derstand how spatial autocorrelation effects conventional statistical assessments.
The dissimilarity index is defined as follow.
D = .5
∑ |Bj/B −Wj/W | (4.13)
,where B and W are total number of nonwhite and white subareas in a geographic
system, and Bj and Wj are the nonwhite and white number of assignments of
subareas within the school zone.7
6See footnote 5 of this chapter.
7For this measure we need categorical variables so the income realizations below, in section
4.4.1, Monte Carlo simulations have been transformed into a binary values as a function of
whether they are above or below zero.
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4.3 Local index of sorting by a boundary
In this section, I introduce a local inequality measure because of empirical
and substantive problems with global measures. The empirical problem is that
residential self-sorting, or residential de facto segregation, can obscure judgments
of school segregation by the design of school attendance zones (explored in the
next section). The substantive problem is that global measures, when they show
no evidence of institutional unfairness, may mask local suffering on the part of
some neighborhoods in terms of social isolation.
Legal solutions to change the boundaries are made complex due to the un-
certainty around the intentionality of the segregated attendance zone boundaries
in view of larger patterns of voluntary residential movements across attendance
zones, as well as the hardships of increased transportation costs that desegrega-
tion policy changes may cause. The characterization of the mechanisms underlying
school segregation have been legally polarized between the terms de jure and de
facto segregation. I believe, assuming the perspective of a hypothetical local resi-
dent that seeks increased interracial contact, that there can exist a subtle middle
ground, where one cannot distinguish between de facto and de jure segregation
since both can contemporaneously exist. I propose an empirically based index to
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assess the significance of this situation for local areas of a city that is based on a
test for the significance of a local school segregated pattern of school attendance.
The problem with global measures is that they ignore the income dissimilarities
that exist just at the edge of a school zone’s boundary. The new local approach
is based on the idea that we can capture a local resident’s spatial view of inequal-
ity within a measure. One’s judgments regarding the geographic distribution of
a social attribute may partly be a function of what one can concretely observe
with one’s eyes. A child resident of a neighborhood has a geographic horizon from
which she can infer patterns of racial segregation in the world. What appears ran-
dom to her may appear clustered to the researcher, and vice versa, what appears
clustered to her may appear random. The intention here is to formulate a measure
to capture this perspective regarding the affect of how a boundary representing
areal assignments to some institution, such as a school attendance zone, may be
perceived as sorting children to increase inequality, capturing a sentiment of po-
tential social isolation of how a boundary divides social interactions of people in
the same geographic vicinity.
The global measure of equation 4.12 is based on the proposition that if there
was no school zone children would be free to interact with one another within
the geographic field of study, irrespective of their relative location to one another.
This may be socially realistic. In other words, this proposition is equivalent to
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weight all pair-wise deviations dij the same, ignoring variation in gij’s within the
study area (i.e. g11 = g12 = ...gnn = 1). It may be questionable to weight all
pairs the same, especially if the objective is to capture the perspective of a local
resident’s feeling of being socially sorted, or segregated, rather than assessing
institutional unfairness in overall attendance zone design.
A local average approach is given by
Ai =
V (Gi C)
V (Gi)
(4.14)
This measure is calculated just for subareas along the boundary of a school zone
to highlight particular segments that effect inequality or unbalanced assignments.
The key difference between the global and local average measure is how we ge-
ographically shrink the notion of a neighborhood, N(i) (from section 4.2.1) to
define equation 4.14.
One notion of a neighborhood is the geographic area that we consider the
potential social encounters amongst children in i to be spatially bounded by. (In
concrete terms, one way we could imagine a local conception of a neighborhood
is the area within which a child can bike or walk to meet her friends.) Figure 4.2
illustrates the spatial relationships by which the local measure is calculated. The
block subareas that have a thick edge denote ones that are along the boundary
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Figure 4.2: Boundary subareas a school zone and local neighborhood of subareas
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of the school zone, the subareas that are used to compute the local measure. All
numbered blocks in figure 4.2 are considered to be part of the neighborhood set
N(i), where i is block 66 (i = 66). (In figure 4.2, I use the digits at the top of the
block subareas to denote the value of their indices i. These match their coordinate
positions on the lattice where an index of i = 00 would denote a subarea block
located in the bottom left corner of the grid.) For this local neighborhood, the
in-zone subset of blocks is (55, 56, 65, 66) and the out-zone set of blocks is (57,
67, 75, 76, 77, 76). The local measure of equation 4.14 computed for i = 66 can
be understood as a fraction of the summation of squared income gaps between the
in-zone blocks (55, 56, 65, 66) and out-zone blocks (57, 67, 75, 76, 77, 76) over
the summation of all the pair-wise gaps for i’s local neighborhood set (55, 56, 57,
65, 66, 67, 75, 76, 77).
Statistical inference for the local inequality measure is problematic because of
the small number of combinations due to the small sized neighborhoods defined
with N(i). Instead of random shuﬄing of assignments, as done with the global
inequality measure, an empirical distribution can be made by exhaustively calcu-
lating different realizations of the measure for all possible combinations of in-zone
subareas that could be assigned from each subareas set of neighborhoods. The
advantage with this method is that we can at least know the number of possible
unique combinations the reference distribution is built upon.
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The number of possible unique combinations of objects when the order of
objects doesn’t matter and objects are replaceable (cannot be repeated within a
combination realization) is as follows:
 n
r
 = n!r!(n− r)!
Empirical distributions of the local inequality measure for the block subareas
on the corners of the boundary area, such as block i = 66 in figure 4.2, are based
on taking different combinations of 4 in-zone subarea objects from a total of 9
subareas (n = 9, r = 4) to calculate the measure. This results is 126 combinations
of in-zone sets, the remaining non-corner blocks would have 84 combinations (n =
9, r = 3). If the actual local measure for a neighborhood N(i) is more extreme
than a significant part of the distribution of realizations based on all possible
combinations of school assignments in the neighborhood, then this is evidence that
a resident of that neighborhood would feel that the school boundary unequally
divides her neighborhood’s social relationships.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show simulated results of the local measure. In figure
4.3, the bottom of each block reports the value of yi, income realization in each
subarea i. The blocks along the zone boundary (with darker edges) contain more
information. The subarea index i is reported in the top of the block only when
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that subarea is associated with a local index that has a percentage value (pseudo-
pvalue) of .05 or less, indicating that its surrounding neighborhood has been seg-
regated by the boundary segment: 36, 53, 63, 64, 65. For example, in the top
left block i = 36 the middle pair of numbers report the results from the local
inequality index test. The first number in the pair, .02, denotes the percentage of
times the spatial permutations are greater than the actual measure. The second
number 126 denotes the number of possible spatial combinations that were used
to build the empirical distribution.
4.4 Inequality measures in the presence of spatial auto-
correlation
In this section, I discuss the empirical problem of the presence of spatial au-
tocorrelation on assessing school zone income inequality. In the presence of resi-
dential segregation there may be a problem in identifying unfair segregation with
global measures. If the underlying data generating process of the geographic in-
come distribution between neighborhoods within and outside of a school zone is
based on a combination of spatial dependence of incomes and institutional design,
then it may not be possible to determine how much of total inequality between
in-zone and out-zone assigned children is the responsibility of the design of the
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Figure 4.3: Hypothetical geographic space with a school zone, income realiza-
tions, and block-like subareas
school zone and how much from clustered residential patterns. The spatially pat-
terned income values in figures 4.3 and 4.4 suggest how a randomly designed school
zone might be wrongly inferred as being intentionally segregated in the presence
of residential income sorting (spatial autocorrelation of incomes). The clustered
patterns of high (light) and low (dark) values in figures 4.3 and 4.4 also illustrate
how spatial autocorrelation of the income realizations can replicate residential
income segregation.
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Figure 4.4: Hypothetical segregated school zone in presence of spatial
autocorrelation
The dissimilarity index for describing school zone inequality in figure 4.3 is .37.
The inequality measure A is 3.59. The realizations yi in figure 4.3 are based on a
spatial autoregressive data generating process (ρ = .9). The school zone income
inequality we observe in figure 4.3 is actually not due to an unfair or segregated
zonal design, but essentially a random design of school assignments that appears
as though it is intentionally segregated.
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4.4.1 Simulations
Although segregation measures are mainly used in a descriptive fashion, their
statistical interpretations may shed light on how their results match our normative
concerns. The size performance of spatial permutation tests for three types of in
inequality measures are investigated here: the global income inequality index A
in equation 4.12, the local inequality index Ai in equation 4.14, and an index of
dissimilarity, D in equation 4.13 below.
Simulated realizations are from a spatial DGP (explained with equation 3.4 in
chapter 3 of this dissertation) with different degrees of dependence ρ:
y = (I− ρW)−1et, (4.15)
y is a vector of income values for the subareas. W denotes a binary contiguity
matrix that has been row standardized.
The objective of the Monte Carlo simulations was to see what percentage
of times the three tests falsely reject a true null hypothesis of random assign-
ments. The ‘true’ pvalues upon which the performance of the permutation tests
are assessed against are based on forming empirical distributions based on 1000
realizations of y from equation 4.15.
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Table 4.1: Monte Carlo results of false positives of zonal inequality under a
spatial data generating process of σe = 1, N = 100 (pvalue = 0.05)
Fraction of tests rejected for the null hypothesis
ρ Dissimilarity Index, D Global Inequality, A Local Inequality A
.0 0.05 0.05 0.05
.3 0.11 0.07 0.06
.6 0.20 0.10 0.07
.9 0.38 0.12 0.11
The table shows the percentage of 1,000 replications that gave a larger test statistic than the
value corresponding to their permutation test five-percent significance level.
Table 4.4.1 shows the results of the simulation experiment for all test statis-
tics. Table 4.4.1 reports the percentage of the replications that gave a larger test
statistic than the value corresponding to the ’true’ five-percent significance level
(based on 1000 realizations of income vectors). The rows of the table organize
Monte Carlo draws that are based on varying degrees of spatial dependence for
generating the values yi.
The size of the spatial dependence parameter, p, has a positive influence on the
variance of the test statistics for the all three inequality measures, but especially
for the dissimilarity index. This suggests that spatial dependence makes it harder
to identify whether a school zone segregates children using global measures because
of the increasing likelihood of a Type I error.
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4.5 Summary
We don’t know the true data generating process causing school zone income
inequality. However, even if there is evidence of no intent in the design of a school
zone to segregate, this does not preclude some segments of a boundary from
reinforcing the negative outcomes of segregated residential patterns. Therefore
this chapter proposed a local inequality measure aimed at identifying harmful
boundary segments in terms of outcomes, instead of inferring unfairness. Measures
following this local approach could allow one to judge if specific segments along
a boundary could be perceived by a local resident to divide a child’s surrounding
neighborhood into poor blocks within the zone and rich blocks outside the zone.
The proposed metric can be applied to political discussions on changing the
configuration of a school zone which is suspected of contributing to the isolation
of minority school children. As an exploratory tool, the metric could also be
applied to finding pockets of high differentials in terms of health outcomes along
other types of boundaries that divide health services, such as for countries, states,
counties. The advantage of a local approach is that it controls for many other
factors shared by people living next to one another, which we might not have
data for, such as genetics and climate. For example, Gladwell (1998) explains
how the health differentials among members of the Pima Indian tribe living on
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different side of the Mexican-American border provides a natural experiment for
understanding factors of obesity. The method proposed here could be used as an
exploratory tool to find similar types of observations.
As a future direction of research, significance testing can be based on condi-
tional spatial permutations. Instead of shuﬄing only the income values of con-
tiguous areas surrounding each boundary segment to get a test statistic for that
segment, we can randomly pull income values from the full geographic extent and
shuﬄe them among areas along different segments. This type of statistical test
may allow us to cope with mean income heterogeneity on the landscape.
The significance of this measure is that we can assess inequality in terms of
local suffering caused by local boundary segments instead of focusing on assessing
the institutional unfairness of an entire school attendance zone design.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 dealt with measuring inequality using the distribution of
incomes across neighborhoods, states, and school attendance zones, respectively.
Each of these chapters illustrated an approach to assess inequality that can be
divided into 3 steps or objectives. The first objective was to develop a spatial
view of inequality. The second objective was to incorporate this spatial view of
inequality into the inequality assessment using a spatial weights matrix. The
third objective of each chapter was to understand the empirical significance of
incorporating a spatial weights matrix.
The dissertation started with an introductory chapter that introduced the
preliminary ideas of understanding a spatial view of inequality. Our intention to
quantify inequality using statistical measures is based on a practical goal to com-
municate information on public concerns in an objective manner. The ultimate
goal of inequality statistics is to inform society’s awareness of suffering and judg-
ments of institutional unfairness. It is important then that the formulation of our
aggregative measures validly matches the reality of the situation in terms of how
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different income gaps hold different significance to different concerns. In more
concrete terms, it is important that the objectively measured size of an overall
change upwards (or downwards) of an inequality statistic actually corresponds to
when a situation has become normatively worse (or better).
In chapter 2, the motivating normative concern for assessing neighborhood
income inequality was related to suffering. Sudden income gap changes can effect a
reduction of a poorer community’s ability to obtain absolute economic capabilities
such as health care and education for which they may be in competition with other
communities. A key empirical finding was that different geographic and racial
patterns of changing inequality do not move in concordance with one another,
and may even move in opposite directions, putting into question the relevance of
aggregate assessments of neighborhood income inequality changes.
In chapter 3, the motivating concern for assessing state income inequality re-
lated to unfairness. Assessments of changes in the distribution of income across
regions of a political system can provide information for appraising those institu-
tions that regulate the conflicting economic interests of the different geopolitical
units of the political system. Fan and Casetti (1997) used an observation of an
increase in the dispersion of incomes of states of the United States in the 1980’s as
evidence that the ideas behind the Neoclassical economic convergence hypothesis
are obsolete. This conclusion can be interpreted in terms of the expected fairness
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associated with the structure of the political economic system towards initially
poor regions. To examine how spatial aspects of the data complicate matters, I
incorporated a spatial weights matrix into a convergence data generating process.
The idea was to model how the distributions of state incomes can be changing
both from an aspatial catch-up convergence component and a random spatial error
component. The results of this spatial error model were then used to filter out the
spatial component from a time-series of income dispersion. The results showed
the divergence in the 1980’s may not have necessarily been caused by a large
change in the underlying convergence process, but rather could plausibly have
been caused from a geographically patterned economic disturbance. My results
conflict with Fan and Casetti (1997)’s statements that the idea of convergence to
describe the economic has become obsolete. The results of chapter 3 showed that
assessing state income inequality as unfairness is more complex when we take a
spatial view of how income gaps change. There can simultaneously be an underly-
ing convergence process that characterizes the fairness of the overall institutional
structure along with expected periods of divergence due to random shocks over
time that are not related to changes in the convergence mechanism, but whose
significance in terms of unfairness appears magnified by their spatial patterning.
In terms of suffering, for chapter 4, the concern regarding school segregation
is how the attendance zone boundaries may act as a barrier to potential inter-
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racial social interaction. For this issue, the spatial view taken is that nearby pairs
of neighborhoods are more important to children’s potential encounters than far
away neighborhoods. From this local spatial perspective of a child resident a
local measure highlighting particular segments of an institutional boundary was
formulated. The significance of this measure is that we can assess inequality in
terms of local suffering caused by local boundary segments instead of focusing on
assessing the institutional fairness of an entire school attendance zone design.
This dissertation contributes to understanding how we think geographically
about our inequality concerns. Our brains naturally organize information about
human relations geographically. In doing so our geographic representations of the
world may be a source of bias in how me measure human welfare. Geography, as
a way of gaining and communicating knowledge about human welfare, categorizes
individuals in terms of abstract classes such as regions, states, cities, and neigh-
borhoods. A common map with political boundaries is a simple, common example
of how these conventional classes are used to represent a collective perception of
the real world spatial relations amongst people. Questions of geographic thought
addressed by this dissertation are, Does our conventional geographic understand-
ing of how people are associated with one another realistically match the concrete
reality of suffering and unfairness in societies, and, To what degree are the re-
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sults of our measurements of human welfare robust to the choice of geographic
associations we use?
Unlike fields such as geology or astronomy, which also map spatial relations,
in human geography we are often mapping relations that are unobservable. There
is no empirical way to objectively come to an agreement on the best geographic
representation of an inequality problem. We must rely on common notions of
suffering and unfairness, and descriptions of our intuitive notions regarding geo-
graphic associations. Furthermore, by being forced to highlight a chosen subset
of associations over some other subset, a single analysis must inevitably mask
suffering or obscure unfairness to some degree. Therefore, exploratory data anal-
ysis that experiments with multiple spatial weights matrices for a single problem
may be a fruitful direction. We cannot be certain that incorporating a spatial
weights matrix is a better approximation to human associations than not doing
so. Nevertheless, in an exploratory sense, spatial analysis results provide us with
information to test whether plausible alternative spatial views have empirical sig-
nificance. If they do, then this alludes to the fact that we should think deeper
about how our implicit generalizations on spatial structure match the concerns
we wish to prioritize.
Formulas for computing inequality statistics are not transparent in how they
make implicit spatial generalizations. Or, in other words, as Temkin (1993) says,
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in a different context, it is “not written on their sleeves”. So at a minimum,
incorporation of a spatial weights matrix into inequality assessments highlights
how some sort of spatial presumption of human economic associations is behind
our quantitative assessments. In addition, evaluation of this spatial presumption
cannot be done in a manner that is as objective as it may appear to be by the
equations within which they are embedded. This is because such evaluations
must be informed by normative considerations(Sen, 1995, 1977). In summary, it
is important not to ignore the spatial arrangement of our income observations
when they are referenced geographically in our data.
123
References
Anselin, L. (2003). Spatial externalities, spatial multipliers, and spatial econo-
metrics. International Regional Science Review, 26(2):156–166.
Anselin, L. and Getis, A. (2010). Spatial statistical analysis and geographic in-
formation systems. Perspectives on Spatial Data Analysis, pages 35–47.
Azzoni, C. R. (2001). Economic growth and income inequality in Brazil. Annals
of Regional Science, 31(1):133–152.
Barro, R. (2002). The U.N. is dead wrong on poverty and inequality. Business-
Week, May 6:24.
Barro, R. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (2003). Economic Growth. McGraw-Hill, London,
2nd edition.
Barro, R. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (2004a). Economic Growth. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA, 2nd edition.
Barro, R. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (2004b). Economic Growth. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA, 2nd edition.
Bernard, A. B. and Durlauf, S. N. (1996). Interpreting tests of the convergence
hypothesis. Journal of Econometrics, 71(1-2):p161 – 173.
Blau, J. R. and Blau, P. M. (1982). The cost of inequality: Metropolitan structure
and violent crime. American Sociological Review, pages 114–129.
Blau, P. (1977). Inequality and heterogeneity. Free Press New York.
Borjas, G. J. (1995). Ethnicity, neighborhoods, and human-capital externalities.
The American Economic Review, 85(3):365–390.
Carree, M. A. and Klomp, L. (1997). Testing the convergence hypothesis: a
comment. Review of Economics and Statsitics, 77:683–686.
Census Bureau (2013). U.S. Census Bureau: FAQs.
Chakravorty, S. (1996). A measurement of spatial disparity: The case of income
inequality. Urban Studies, 33(9):1671–1686.
124
Chen, J. and Fleisher, B. M. (1996). Regional income inequality and economic
growth in china. Journal of Comparative Economics, 22:141–164.
Clark, W. A. (1991). Residential preferences and neighborhood racial segregation:
A test of the schelling segregation model. Demography, 28(1):1–19.
Cliff, A. D. and Ord, J. (1973). Spatial Autocorrelation. Pion, London.
Clotfelter, C. (2004). After Brown: The Rise and Retreat of School Desegregation.
Princeton University Press.
Coughlin, C. C. and Mandelbaum, T. B. (1988). Why have state per-capita
incomes diverged recently? Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
70:24–36.
Cowell, F. A. (1995). Measuring Inequality. Prentice Hall, London.
Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics,
and violence against women of color. Stanford Law Review, pages 1241–1299.
Cressie, N. A. C. (1991). Statistics for spatial data. New York.
Cuadrado-Roura, J., Garcia-Greciano, B., and Raymond, J. (1999). Regional
convergence in productivity and productivity structure: The Spanish case. In-
ternational Regional Science Review, 22:35–53.
Deaton, A. (2003). Health, inequality, and economic development health, inequal-
ity, and economic development health, inequality, and economic development.
Journal of Economic Literature, 41(1):113–158.
Delaney, D. (2001). The boundaries of responsibility: Interpretations of geography
in school desegregation. In Blomley, N., Delaney, D., and Ford, R. T., editors,
The Legal Geographies Reader: Law, Power, and Space, pages 54–68. Blackwell
Publishers.
Diez-Roux, A., Link, B., and Northridge, M. (2000). A multilevel analysis of
income inequality and cardiovascular disease risk factors. Social science &
medicine, 50(5):673–687.
Drennan, M. P. and Lobo, J. (1999). A simple test for convergence of metropolitan
income in the United States. Journal of Urban Economics, 46:350–359.
125
Drennan, M. P., Lobo, J., and Strumsky, D. (2005). Unit root tests of sigma
income convergence across US metroplotan areas. Journal of Economic Geog-
raphy, 4:583–595.
Duncan, O. and Duncan, B. (1955). A methodological analysis of segregation
indexes. American Sociological Review, 20(2):210–217.
Duque, J. C. (2004). Design of Homogenous Territorial Units. A Methodological
Proposal and Applications. PhD thesis, Universitat de Barcelona.
Durlauf, S. N. (2004). A theory of persistent income inequality. Journal of Eco-
nomic Growth, 1(1):75–93.
Epple, D. (2003). Modeling population stratification across locations: an overview.
International Regional Science Review, 26(2):189–196.
Epple, D. and Platt, G. J. (1998). Equilibrium and local redistribution in an urban
economy when households differ in both preferences and incomes. Journal of
Urban Economics, 43(1):23–51.
Epple, D. N. and Romano, R. (2003). Neighborhood schools, choice, and the
distribution of educational benefits. In The economics of school choice, pages
227–286. University of Chicago Press.
Fan, C. C. and Casetti, E. (1994). The spatial and temporal dynamics of U.S.
regional income inequality. Annals of Regional Science, 28:177–196.
Fan, C. C. and Casetti, E. (1997). The spatial and temporal dynamics of us
regional income inequality, 1950-1989. The Annals Regional Science, 28:177–
196.
Foster, J. E. and Sen, A. (1997). On Economic Inequality. Oxford University
Press, New Delhi.
Friedman, M. (1992). Do old fallacies ever die? Journal of Economic Literature,
XXX:2129–2132.
Galbraith, J. K. and Hale, J. T. (2008). State income inequality and presidential
election turnout and outcomes. Social Science Quarterly, 89(4):887–901.
Getis, A. (1991). Spatial interaction and spatial autocorrelation: a cross product
approach. Environment and Planning A, 23(9):1269 – 1277.
126
Getis, A. (2008). A history of the concept of spatial autocorrelation: a geogra-
pher’s perspective. Geographical Analysis, 40(3):297–309.
Gezici, F. and Hewings, G. (2004). Regional convergence and the economic per-
formance of peripheral areas in Turkey. Review of Urban and Regional Devel-
opment Studies, 16(2):113–132.
Gladwell, M. (1998). The Pima Paradox. The New Yorker.
Hubert, L. J., Golledge, R. G., and Constanza, C. M. (1981). Generalized proce-
dures for evaluating spatial autocorrelation. Geographical Analysis, 13:224–231.
Isard, W. (1951). Interregional and regional input-output analysis: a model of a
space-economy. The review of Economics and Statistics, 33(4):318–328.
Janikas, M. (2006). Comparative Regional Income Dynamics: Clustering, Scale,
and Geocomputation. PhD thesis, San Diego State University and University of
California, Santa Barbara.
Janikas, M. V. and Rey, S. J. (2005). Spatial clustering, inequality, and income
convergence. Re´gion et De´veloppement, 25:41–64.
Jargowsky, P. and Kim, J. (2005). A measure of spatial segregation: The gen-
eralized neighborhood sorting index. Technical report, University of Texas at
Dallas.
Jarkowsky, P. (1997). Poverty and Place: Ghettos, barrios, and the American
city. Russel Sage Foundation, New York.
Jian, T., Sachs, J. D., and Warner, A. M. (1996). Trends in regional inequality in
china. China Economic Review, 7(1):1–21.
Kanbur, R. and Zhang, X. (1999). Which regional inequality? The evolution
of rural-urban and inland-coastal inequality in China, 1983-1995. Journal of
Comparative Economics, 27:686–701.
Kennedy, B., Kawachi, I., Glass, R., and Prothrow-Stith, D. (1998). Income
distribution, socioeconomic status, and self rated health in the united states:
multilevel analysis. BMJ: British Medical Journal, 317(7163):917.
Kennedy, P. (2003). A Guide to Econometrics. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
fifth edition.
Kozol, J. (1991). Savage Inequalities. Crown, New York.
127
Kozol, J. (2005). The Shame of the Nation: The Restoration of Apartheid School-
ing in America. Crown Publishers.
Krieger, N., Williams, D. R., and Moss, N. E. (1997). Measuring social class
in us public health research: Concepts, methodologies, and guidelines public
health research:measuring social class in us public health research: Concepts,
methodologies, and guidelines. Annu. Rev. Public Health, 18:341–378.
Krugman, P. and Venables, A. (1995). Globalization and the Inequality of Nations.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(4):857–880.
Le Gallo, J. and Ertur, C. (2002). Exploratory spatial data analysis of the dis-
tribution of regional per capita GDP in Europe, 1980-1995. Papers in Regional
Science, Forthcoming.
Levernier, W., Partridge, M. D., and Rickman, D. S. (1998). Differences in
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan us family income inequality: A cross-county
comparison. Journal of Urban Economics, 44(2):272–290.
Levernier, W., Partridge, M. D., and Rickman, D. S. (2000). The causes of regional
variations in us poverty: A cross-county analysis. Journal of Regional Science,
40(3):473–497.
Levernier, W., Rickman, D. S., and Partridge, M. D. (1995). Variation in us
state income inequality: 1960-1990. International Regional Science Review,
18(3):355–378.
Lichtenberg, F. R. (1994). Testing the convergence hypothesis. The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 76(3):576–579.
Lieberson, S. and Carter, D. K. (1982). A model for inferring the voluntary and
involuntary causes of residential segregation. Demography, 19(4):511–526.
Lucas, R. E. (2002). Lectures on Economic Growth. Harvard University Press.
Massey, D. (1979). In what sense a regional problem? Regional Studies, 13(2):233–
243.
Massey, D. S. and Denton, N. A. (1987). Trends in the residential segregation of
blacks, hispanics, and asians: 1970-1980. American Sociological Review, pages
802–825.
128
Massey, D. S. and Denton, N. A. (1993). American Apartheid: Segregation and
the Making of the American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Un-
derclass. Harvard University Press, MA.
Morrill, R. L. (1991). On the measure of spatial segregation. Geography Research
Forum, pages 25–36.
Mossi, M. B., Aroca, P., Fernandez, I., and Azzoni, C. R. (2003). Growth dynamics
and space in Brazil. International Regional Science Review, 26(3):393–418.
Nissan, E. and Carter, G. (1999). Spatial and temporal metropolitan and non-
metropolitan trends in income inequality. Growth and Change, 30(3):407–415.
Oppenshaw, S. and Taylor, P. (1991). The modifiable areal unit problem. In
Wrigley, N. and Bennett, R., editors, Quantitative geography, pages 60–69.
Routledge and Kegan Paul, Cancer, 1991:126–58. Lon- don, United Kingdom.
Partridge, J. S., Partridge, M. D., and Rickman, D. S. (1998). State patterns in
family income inequality. Contemporary Economic Policy, 16(3):277–294.
Partridge, M. D. and Rickman, D. S. (2007). Persistent rural poverty: Is it simply
remoteness and scale? Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 29(3):430–
436.
Partridge, M. D., Rickman, D. S., and Levernier, W. (1996). Trends in us income
inequality: evidence from a panel of states. The Quarterly Review of Economics
and Finance, 36(1):17–37.
Quah, D. T. (1996a). Empirics for economic growth and convergence. European
Economic Review, 40:1353–1375.
Quah, D. T. (1996b). Regional convergence clusters across Europe. European
Economic Review, 40:951–958.
Quah, D. T. (2002). One third of the world’s growth and inequality. London
School of Economics, CEPR DP3316.
Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.
Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.
Rawls, J. and Kelly, E. (2001). Justice as fairness: A restatement. Harvard
University Press.
129
Reardon, S. and O’Sullivan, D. (2004). Measures of Spatial Segregation. Socio-
logical Methodology, 34:121–162.
Rey, S. (2004a). Spatial Analysis of Regional Income Inequality. In Spatialy
Integrated Social Science, pages 280–299. Oxford University Press, USA.
Rey, S. and Dev, B. (2006a). Sigma-convergence in the presence of spatial effects.
Papers in Regional Science, 85(2):217–234.
Rey, S. and Dev, B. (2006b). Sigma-convergence in the presence of spatial effects.
Papers in Regional Science Papers in Regional Science, 85(2):217–234.
Rey, S. J. (2001). Spatial empirics for economic growth and convergence. Geo-
graphical Analysis, 33(3):195–214.
Rey, S. J. (2002). Spatial dependence in the evolution of regional income distri-
butions. In Getis, A., Mu´r, J., and Zoeller, H., editors, Spatial econometrics
and spatial statistics. Palgrave, Hampshire.
Rey, S. J. (2004b). Spatial dependence in the evolution of regional income dis-
tributions. In Getis, A., Mu´r, J., and Zoeller, H., editors, Spatial econometrics
and spatial statistics. Palgrave, Hampshire.
Rey, S. J. and Dev, B. (1997). Integrating econometric and input-output models
in a multiregional context. Growth and Change, 28:222–243.
Rey, S. J. and Folch, D. C. (2011). Impact of spatial effects on income segregation
indices. Computers, Environment and Urban Systems, 35(6):431–441.
Rey, S. J. and Janikas, M. V. (2005). Regional convergence, inequality, and space.
Journal of Economic Geography, 5(2):155–176.
Rey, S. J. and Montouri, B. D. (1999). U.S. regional income convergence: A
spatial econometric perspective. Regional Studies, 33:143–156.
Rivas, M. G. (2007). The effects of trade openness on regional inequality in mexico
the effects of trade openness on regional inequality in mexico. The Annals of
Regional Science, 41(3):545–561.
Sala-i-Martin, X. (2006). The world distribution of income: Falling poverty and
. . . convergence, period. Quarerly Journal of Economics, 121(2):351–397.
Sala-i-Martin, X. X. (1996). The classical approach to convergence analysis. The
Economic Journal, 106(437):1019–1036.
130
Sa´nchez-Reaza, J. and Rodr´ıguez-Pose, A. (2002). The impact of trade liberaliza-
tion on regional disparities in mexico. Growth and Change, 33(1):72–90.
Schelling, T. C. (1971). Dynamic models of segregation. Journal of mathematical
sociology, 1(2):143–186.
Sen, A. (1977). Starvation and exchange entitlements: a general approach and
its application to the great Bengal famine. Cambridge Journal of Economics,
1(1):33–59.
Sen, A. (1995). Inequality reexamined. Oxford University Press.
Sen, A. (1997). From income inequality to economic inequality. Southern Eco-
nomic Journal, 64(2):384–401.
Sen, A. and Foster, J. (2006). On Economic Inequality. Oxford University Press.
Shorrocks, A. F. (1982). Inequality decomposition by factor components. Econo-
metrica, 50(1):193–211.
Smith, A. (1776). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations.
In Campell, R. and Skinner, A., editors, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
of the Wealth of Nations. Clarendon Press, 1976 edition.
Solow, R. (1956). A contribution to the theory of economic growth. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 70:65–94.
Subramanian, S. et al. (2004). The relevance of multilevel statistical meth-
ods for identifying causal neighborhood effects. Social Science and Medicine,
58(10):1961–1968.
Subramanian, S., Kawachi, I., and Kennedy, B. (2001). Does the state you live
in make a difference? multilevel analysis of self-rated health in the us. Social
Science & Medicine, 53(1):9–19.
Temkin, L. (1993). Inequality. Oxford University Press.
Tiebout, C. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political
Economy, 64(5):416–424.
Tortosa-Ausina, E., Perez, F., Mas, M., and Goerlich, F. (2005). Growth and
Convergence Profiles in the Spanish Provinces(1965-1997)*. Journal of Regional
Science, 45(1):147–182.
131
Tukey, J. (1977). Exploratory Data Analysis. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.
U.S.551 (2007). Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District.
Supreme Court of the United States.
U.S.717 (1974). Milliken v. Bradley, 418. Supreme Court of the United States.
Walzer, M. (1983). Spheres of justice: A defense of pluralism and equality. Basic
Books.
White, M. J. (1983). The measurement of spatial segregation. American Journal
of Sociology, pages 1008–1018.
Wilson, W. (1987a). The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass,
and Public Policy.
Wilson, W. J. (1987b). The Truly Disadvantaged. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago.
Wong, D. W. (1993). Spatial indices of segregation. Urban studies, 30(3):559–572.
Xue, J. (1997). Urban-rural income disparity and its significance in china. Hitot-
subashi Journal of Economics, 38(1):45–59.
Yamamoto, D. (2008). Scales of regional income disparities in the USA, 1955
2003. Journal of Economic Geography, 8(1):79.
Zhang, J. (2004). A dynamic model of residential segregation. Journal of Mathe-
matical Sociology, 28(3):147–170.
132
